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THESIS

SEXY IS WHAT YOU MAKE IT: ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE AND U.S. ARMY SPECIAL FORCES

by

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13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)

The U.S. Army Special Forces (SF) are the most highly trained, best equipped, and most seasoned soldiers to which the United States can turn to achieve national security objectives. The future, however, will require more indirect application of SF, through special warfare operations (e.g., UW, FID, etc.), in a host of hostile and undefined areas around the globe. This manner of employment is a change in emphasis from the direct combat operations that have been the norm over the past decade of war. In order to prepare adequately for future indirect operations, SF must change the focus of its training. Expertise in non-lethal skills will become an increasing requirement for mission success. This research, however, has identified a roadblock to such an endeavor. An informal organizational culture has developed in SF that focuses greatly on building the lethal skill sets over the non-lethal ones.

Through analysis of survey data, this research diagnoses the condition of the overarching organizational culture of the SF Groups. It also identifies various aspects of that culture at the Operational Detachment-Alpha (ODA) level, that hinder SF's ability to perform optimally. This study provides recommendations for correcting the shortcomings of the current dominant organizational culture to support the indirect method that will bring future operational successes.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

ADP	Army Doctrine Publication
ARSOF	Army Special Operations Forces
ATP	Army Doctrine and Training Publication
BN	battalion
COIN	counterinsurgency operations
CONOP	concept of operations
DOCS	Denison Organizational Culture Survey
DOD	Department of Defense
FID	foreign internal defense
FM	field manual
LTG	lieutenant general
NCO	non-commissioned officer
ODA(s)	Operational Detachment(s)-Alpha
ODB(s)	Operational Detachment(s)-Bravo
SF	Special Forces
SFAS	Special Forces Assessment and Selection
SFG(s)	Special Forces Group(s)
SOF	Special Operations Forces
SW	Special Warfare
USASOC	United States Army Special Operations Command
USSOCOM	United States Special Operations Command
UW	unconventional warfare

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I.   INTRODUCTION AND PROBLEM STATEMENT

A.   INTRODUCTION

U.S. Army Special Forces (SF) are America's premier fighting force; selected, trained, and experienced in the attributes and skills that the United States requires to defeat her asymmetric, unorthodox, and adaptable foes. Over the previous decade of employment, SF has done just that in various parts of the world.

However, for more than a decade SF has, for the most part, been used in a largely direct manner to support counterinsurgency operations (COIN) in combat, particularly in Iraq and Afghanistan. Senior Department of Defense (DOD) and Special Operations Forces (SOF) leaders have identified that the future operating environment will be vastly different than in the recent past. This fact will require strategic shifts of mission focus, requiring SF to be used in a more indirect manner; conducting more "special warfare" (SW) activities such as foreign internal defense (FID), unconventional warfare (UW) and the building of a Global SOF Network.

Additionally, changes will be made in how SF trains and operates in order to properly prepare to maintain pressure on the enemies of America and to ensure greater success in achieving our national security requirements. This shift in mission and training focus, in accordance with a shift in strategy, requires Special Forces Groups (SFGs) to train on less kinetic, or lethal, skills and focus on non-lethal, or "soft," skills such as foreign language proficiency, cultural awareness, political awareness, and network building.

This research assesses the degree to which such a shift in focus is attainable. More specifically, this work analyzes whether informal organizational culture has developed in the Special Forces Groups that places too great an emphasis on preparing for kinetic operations performed in a more direct manner. If so, such an organizational culture may run contrary to the goals of SF as a whole and would not be suited to promote the SFGs' ability to gain/maintain the skills necessary to be successful in future asymmetric, uncertain environments.

The results of the empirical research conducted in this study suggest that the current organizational culture of SF hinders, to some degree, its ability to acquire or build the skills and attributes necessary to achieve optimal levels of performance in future indirect application. SF's cultural strength lies in its empowerment of the Operational Detachments-Alpha (ODAs), however the ODAs are not operating in a fashion that ties their actions into an overarching strategy for success. This summation will be expanded upon in Chapters III and IV.

The remainder of this chapter will discuss the changing role of SF, given the United States Special Operations Command's (USSOCOM) and the United States Army Special Operations Command's (USASOC) assessment of the future operating environment. Next, I will highlight the need to align SF's organizational culture with its changing missions and environment as a necessary condition for success. I will then conceptualize and expand on the concept of organizational culture and its relation to organizational performance. I will follow with the research purpose and design and conclude with a roadmap for the remainder of the study.

B.   THE FUTURE OPERATING ENVIRONMENT AND CHANGES NECESSARY FOR SUCCESS

In the foreword to the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) Operating Concept for 2020, Admiral William H. McRaven, USSOCOM Commander, writes that in the "first decade of the 21st Century…SOF primarily supported large-scale contingency operations by conducting counterterrorism operations to find, capture, or kill our adversaries" (USSOCOM, 2013, p. 1). However, USSOCOM outlines several ways in which the future operating environment is changing. It discusses the role that non-state actors, demographic shifts, redistribution and diffusion of global power, globalization, advanced technologies, and enduring conflicts will play on the strategic environment, highlighting that these changes ensure that "uncertain, complex and volatile trends [will] exist" (USSOCOM, 2013, p. 2). In order to address these changes to the environment, USSOCOM says SOF will:

> conduct core activities with a focused, balanced approach through small-footprint distributed operations to understand and influence relevant

populations. USSOCOM optimizes and exploits the Global SOF Network to provide strategic options for National Leadership in support of U.S. Government efforts to enhance stability, prevent conflicts, and when necessary, fight and defeat adversaries. (USSOCOM, 2013, p. 3)

USSOCOM has several key elements of this strategy: Chief among them is emphasis on enduring small-footprint operations within the human terrain to build sustainable partner capacity and increase the Global SOF Network. SOF will accomplish these operational approaches, in part, by developing their expertise on regional issues and cultures (USSOCOM, 2013).

USSOCOM provides this guidance to all SOF, many of which do not have a long history of working by, with, and through the human domain. This would lead many to argue that the members of U.S. Army SF are already skilled in these tasks. However, the United States Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) guidance presented in the Army Special Operations Forces 2022 (ARSOF 2022) blueprint, suggests ARSOF needs to focus on several changes as well to achieve USSOCOM's, DOD's and its own goals.

ARSOF 2022 begins by describing a future operational environment characterized, primarily, by uncertainty: "Future threats will range from standing conventional and unconventional forces to irregular militias and paramilitaries to terrorist groups, criminal elements and any number of hybrids" (ARSOF 2022, 2013, p. 4). In order to be prepared for employment in this uncertain environment, ARSOF 2022 states ARSOF must "provide joint-force commanders scalable nodes, with unmatched levels of tactical skill and language and cultural expertise, which establish persistent and distributed networks that provide the nation precise and nuanced asymmetric capability" (ARSOF 2022, 2013, p. 9).

One way in which ARSOF will accomplish this will be to successfully apply its forces in an indirect manner. USASOC explains that the term "indirect" is a previous attempt to describe what it calls "special warfare" (SW). Special warfare is, "the execution of activities that involve a combination of lethal and non-lethal actions taken by specially trained and educated forces that have a deep understanding of cultures and foreign language, proficiency in small-unit tactics, subversion, sabotage and the ability to

build and fight alongside indigenous combat formations in a permissive, uncertain, or hostile environment" (ARSOF 2022, 2013, p. 10). Special warfare is an umbrella term covering FID, UW, and COIN operations. Chapter II will discuss many of the critical gaps and capabilities that require focus for ARSOF to accomplish missions in the conduct of special warfare operations.

Many writers and experts on military affairs agree with the assessments of USSOCOM and USASOC. Nelson and Wise write for the Center for Strategic and International Studies. They recognize that SOF's traditional competencies in indirect operations will be highly demanded in the future. However, they state, "Due to constant operations in Title 10 combat zones where the U.S. military has the lead, such as Iraq and Afghanistan, SOF's traditional proficiency in conducting indirect action on a global scale has atrophied" (2012, p. 76). They also note that over 80 percent of SOF personnel have been focused on operations in the Middle East and therefore, much of the regional expertise of these units has diminished as well (Nelson & Wise, 2012). However, these two authors recognize that SOF leaders understand the issues and are working to correct deficiencies in order to be prepared for future employment in indirect manners (Nelson & Wise, 2012).

Linda Robinson, a reporter with inside access to USSOCOM has stated, "It is time for special operations forces to prioritize indirect operations" (Robinson, 2012, p. 2) However she warns that in order to do this, "the special operations community will need to reconfigure itself to execute [indirect operations] more skillfully" (Robinson, 2012, p. 2).

The common thread from USSOCOM, USASOC, and noted military historians and journalists is that SF will be called upon, more than ever, to conduct a range of military operations throughout an ever-changing, uncertain environment that is both global in spread and volatile in nature. In order to be prepared to operate in these environments, SF will have to be proficient in skills that make them easily adaptable to their changing environments and operate effectively in the "human terrain" during indirect operations.

C. ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE'S ROLE

The constant rotation into combat operations and the need to prepare SF units to conduct direct actions necessary for success in the manner of which SF was employed required that the SF groups trained certain skills over others. Those skills were trained and rewarded based on good or poor performance accordingly. Those skills were also tested in combat due to the direct manner in which SF was utilized and again, performance was evaluated and rewarded. The cycle of training, evaluating, applying, and evaluating, has advanced an organizational culture that promotes the use of SF in a more direct manner. SF, however, is designed to operate in an opposite manner. Its strength lies in its ability to operate in an indirect manner to achieve strategic utility. The statements above from SOF leaders illustrates their understanding that SF has been used more directly for over a decade of war and though such application was necessary previously, the future requires more indirect operations. It follows that an informal culture was established to match the direct utilization of forces, however in the future, that culture may be a mismatch if command elements are eager to change course and start using SF in a more indirect and irregular manner.

To this end, commanders at all levels have begun focusing SF ODAs' training on the skills listed above. However, during informal discussions with former colleagues, teammates and commanders, it seems, though emphasis and external motivation are provided extremely well by commanders, and to some degree peers, many SF soldiers are not intrinsically motivated to really strive for excellence in the "soft" skills.

Lamb points out in his statement before the House Armed Services Committee's Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities in July, 2012, that

> many SOF recruits joined the force specifically in order to participate in [direct action, counter-terror] operations. In fact, some SOF experts have argued that the allure of direct action has helped fill depleted SOF ranks and that the recruits are disappointed when assigned to units that traditionally focus more on the indirect approach. (Lamb, 2012, p. 15)

He adds that, "USSOCOM will be challenged to reorient Special Forces and other SOF units that historically specialize in indirect approaches to ensure they are well prepared to actually operate this way" (Lamb, 2012, p. 15).

LTG Cleveland understands this point and stresses his concern that changes in training focus must be made in order to achieve future mission success. At the conclusion of ARSOF 2022 LTG Cleveland stresses that "it is imperative that our entire force inculcates these changes into the way they do business…it is in your hands" (ARSOF 2022, 2013, p. 14).

While many would argue that SF performance is driven by strong leadership, military discipline, and the will of operators to execute any given task, organizational culture can either align with organizational goals or serve as a hindrance. A formal definition of organizational culture follows in this chapter, however, essentially, organizational culture may be described as "how we do things around here" and is the internalization of widely-shared norms, values, beliefs and assumptions within an organization that give meaning to tasks, provide internal motivation to do those tasks, and provide the strength to overcome challenges.

Mobey, Wang and Fang discuss the importance of organizational culture in relation to an organization's ability to reach their goals:

> Bureaucratic control could only buy employees bodies but not their hearts. A strong organizational culture, however, can be a primary generator of real motivation and commitment. In a strong and cohesive [organizational] culture, the organization's core values are both intensely held and widely shared. This high intensity of common beliefs makes it relatively easier to draw consensus among employees, to build a focus on important goals and objectives, to reduce potential conflicts, to cultivate a learning environment, and to lower staff turnover (2005, p. 12).

Assuming this point is valid, it follows that for SF to reach its goal of effective employment of missions under the SW or indirect umbrella, the SFGs' organizational cultures must adapt to facilitate motivated, focused training on the necessary skill sets required for SF soldiers to be successful in the uncertain environments of the future. To illustrate this point, Rothstein writes about Special Forces and the UW mission. He states

that even the single mission of, "UW needs a separate and different organizational culture" (Rothstein, 2006, p. 163).

D.   ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE

1.   Evolution of Organizational Culture and Organizational Culture Defined

In business, organizational culture has been studied and theorized under many names since the 1930s. In 1938, Chester Bernard wrote about how organizations that inculcate the feelings, fundamental attitudes, and loyalties of its members would garner more individual interest, which would be to great benefit of the organization as a whole. (Wilson, 1989). Other organizational researchers have described what is now known as "organizational culture" in many ways, called it many things, and determined its effect on performance to many different degrees.

However, as "organizational culture" gained popularity in the 1980s and 1990s, it moved from a disorganized theory to practice amongst corporations. Its popularity amongst business leaders grew because those leaders wanted to increase profit and organizational theorists had shown the strong link between positive, strong organizational cultures and improved effectiveness and performance.

As the study of organizational culture matured and became more developed, however, several theorists defined the term "organizational culture" in their own way. This led to difficulty in study and implementation of cultural measurement and change. What follows is a minute list of varying definitions, which may seem vastly different, however, their commonality lies in the fact that they incorporate ideas or concepts that are "shared or held in common" by the members of the organization (Schein, 1992, p. 8).

- "An internal consistency that shapes behavior, values, and patterns of how people think, act, and speak….'the way we do things around here'…a certain style that provides social energy" (Jennings, 1986, p. 5)

- "The set of important understandings (often unstated) that members of a community share in common: (Sathe, 1985, p. 6)

- "…social interaction and interpretation, as revealed in the behavior they shape" (Schall, 1983, p. 3).

- [Culture is] a set of understandings or meanings shared by a group of people. The meanings are largely tacit among the members, are clearly relevant to a particular group, and are distinctive to the group" (Louis, 1985, p. 74).

Since, it seems, each organizational culture researcher has their own definition of "organizational culture," some scholars argue that it is less important to define organizational culture than it is to examine how it is actually operationalized (Martin, 2002). However a definition is of crucial importance in order to have the basis for understanding what "organizational culture" actually is before one can understand how it influences an organization's performance and how it can be managed.

Therefore, the two published definitions that best fit this study of Special Forces' organizational culture are a conglomerate of the following two:

> A pattern of shared basic assumptions that the group has learned as it solved its problems of external adaptation and internal integration that has worked well enough to be considered valid and, therefore, to be taught to new members as the correct way to perceive, think, and feel in relation to those problems. (Schein, p. 12)

> [Culture is] the pattern of shared beliefs and values that give members of an institution meaning, and provide them with the rules for behavior in their organization. (Davis, 1984, p. 1)

Building on these works, therefore, I will define organizational culture as: shared basic values, beliefs, and assumptions that a group has learned as its solved problems brought about by changes in the external environment and internal integration, that has worked well enough to be considered valid and, therefore, to be taught to new members of the organization that provide them with the rules for behavior and provide direction and motivation for how to perceive, think, and feel and act in relation to those problems.

The above definition was chosen because it is easily relatable to the Special Forces' organizational culture at the ODA level and its measured impact on the SF Regiments' missions, objectives and goals. I now proceed to expand this concept of organizational culture into its component parts for analysis.

2.   Expanding the Concept of Organizational Culture

Organizational culture, in simple terms, can be explained as "what we do around here" and by the old ethical mantra, "doing what's right even when no one is looking." Wilson (1989) states, "Every organization has a culture, that is, a persistent way of thinking about the central tasks of and human relationships within an organization" (Wilson, 1989, p. 91).

Schein (1997) argues that organization's cultures are an accumulation of a group's learning as it pertains to behavioral, emotional, and cognitive elements of the group's total psychological functioning. He adds that for this shared learning to occur, there must be shared experiences amongst members of the group in relation to how they have solved two categories of problems: 1) survival, growth, and adaptation to their environment, and 2) internal integration that permits daily functioning and the ability to adapt.

Organizational culture, according to Cameron and Quinn,

encompasses the taken-for-granted values, underlying assumptions, expectations, collective memories, and definitions present in an organization…it reflects the prevailing ideology that people carry inside their heads. It conveys a sense of identity to employees, provides unwritten and often unspoken guidelines for how to get along in the organization, and it enhances the stability of the social system that they experience. (2006, p. 16).

Organizational culture, therefore, is an informal, shared accumulation of experiences and responses to situations that have occurred over and over again. In that accumulation of experiences are tried-and-tested approaches to dealing with situations that become second nature to employees in an organization. It encompasses the beliefs, values, norms, attitudes, perceptions, and actions that govern how employees will act, deal with adversity, conduct interpersonal relations and get the job done. Culture is the autopilot that employees switch on the moment they arrive at work. While they may make minor course corrections based on changes to the environment, the "autopilot" stays engaged.

Some aspects of organizational culture can easily be seen by an observer and some cannot: "Manifestations of culture include rituals, stories, humor, jargon, physical arrangements, and formal structures and policies, as well as informal norms and practices" (Martin, 2002, p. 55). However, as Schein argues, there are also deeper layers in an organization's culture that may not be as observable.

3.   Levels of Organizational Culture

Schein's concept of organizational culture analyzes culture at several "levels." The term "levels" refers "to the degree to which the cultural phenomenon is visible to the observer" (1997, p. 16). The three levels of observation are artifacts, espoused values, and basic underlying assumptions.

Artifacts are the tangible aspects of an organization's culture. They can be seen, heard, felt, and witnessed easily. Items such as building infrastructure, layout of work spaces, uniforms and accoutrements, professional language, military customs and courtesies, rituals and ceremonies, etc. Schein warns, however, that though this level of culture is easy to observe it is often vary hard to decipher and understand.

However, Schein notes that one may test insights into artifacts only if one has experienced the culture at the very level at which the values and assumptions are being observed.

Espoused values are those stated values that attempt to portray the reason for the organization's actions and provide rules and direction to guide the conduct of its employees. It is how an organization represents itself to its members and the public.

Espoused values therefore are often in line with the organization's mission and are used by the organization as a standard for behavior, or, to use a military term, standard operating procedures. They are important in that they ensure employees follow the value system of the organization rather than their own value systems.

Basic assumptions are solutions for problems that have become so common place that they are taken for granted and rarely, if ever, questioned or examined. The basic assumptions within an organization are so deeply rooted, and therefore never debated or

confronted, which makes any hint at changing them deeply frustrating and stressful for the members of the organization. Since changing these assumptions require great anxiety, Schein argues that organizations will, "tend to want to perceive the events around us as congruent with our assumptions, even if that means distorting, denying, projecting, or in other ways falsifying to ourselves what may be going on around us" (1997, p. 22). This creates a catastrophic dilemma, as basic assumptions are the most important aspect of an organization's culture; the primary driver of decisions and the most influential factor in determining what actions to take to reach the organization's goals.

As the true nature of an organization's culture lies in its basic assumptions, understanding those are a crucial first step in analyzing the overall organizational culture. Once the basic assumptions are understood, a researcher can then interpret artifacts correctly and more easily understand the values. This research will further elaborate on these levels and their relationship to SF's organizational culture in the following chapter. However, it is important to note that much of what the analysis of empirical data collected will uncover concern the underlying assumptions that drive SF's organizational culture. A comprehension of the artifacts, values, and assumptions of SF's culture will lead to an overall understanding of the organizational culture. This knowledge will shape a determination of what changes are necessary in order to create a culture that better encourages desired behaviors and promotes greater degrees of performance.

4. Functions of Organizational Culture and Organizational Performance

Just as "organizational culture" has various definitions by scholars and theorists, so too are there numerous ideas about what good (or bad) it does for an organization. However, a majority of the literature describes organizational culture as having a direct effect on an organization's effectiveness and performance.

The following section discusses the relationship between organizational culture and the effects it has on an organization's internal work processes as well as an organization's performance. This information is foundational to this study. It provides an

understanding of how and why the organizational culture of SF plays a significant role in shaping how the unit operates and is a major factor in supporting high degrees of military performance.

According to Wagner and Hollenbeck, organizational culture serves four basic functions that make it "a sort of social glue" that reinforces actions, attitudes, and behaviors at work:

> It gives members an organizational identity. Sharing norms, values, and perceptions gives people a sense of togetherness that helps promote a feeling of common purpose.
>
> It facilitates collective commitment. The common purpose that grows out of a shared culture tends to elicit strong commitment from all those who accept the culture as their own.
>
> It promotes system stability. By encouraging a shared sense of identity and commitment, culture encourages lasting integration and cooperation among the members of an organization.
>
> It shapes behavior by helping members make sense of their surroundings. An organization's culture serves as a source of shared meanings that explain why things occur the way they do. (Wagner & Hollenbeck, 1992, p. 695)

These four functions that organizational culture fulfill, play a major role in motivation and direction in the absence of supervision, so that what employees do and how they do it, if consistent with the organizational culture, will be in line with the goals of the organization.

Organizational culture, when widely shared and endorsed by employees and managers alike, confers a feeling of special worth to the members of the organization, provides a basis for recruiting and socializing new members, and allows administrators to economize the use of other incentives (Wilson, 1989).

A strongly supported, widely shared organizational culture, or what Wilson calls a "sense of mission" will ensure that employees will not always have to be told what to do, but rather they will instinctively know what to do, why it is important, and be motivated to do what needs to be done (1989).

Sims points out that an organization's culture that has consensus amongst the organization's members will help its members develop a sense of identity with the organization and its direction, mission, and goals. Additionally, employees will agree about how results are measured and how rewards and sanctions will be levied for good or poor performance. Organizational culture will define the boundaries of groups and provide inclusion criteria for membership in the groups, define rules for power and social structure, and define the nature and quality of both peer relationships and interpersonal interactions. A strong organizational culture will help integrate subsystems, subgroups, and processes to allow the organization to coordinate its various functions and divisions effectively. Organizational culture will also develop and communicate the organization's ideology which, according to Sims, can be a strong and sometimes overwhelming, guide to action. Lastly, Sims argues, that "an organizational culture that gives its members a clear vision of the organization's mission also presents a consistent image to its markets, customers, and clients" (Sims, 2002, pp. 304–305).

As discussed previously, organizational culture is believed by most theorists and practitioners to have a strong link to the organization's performance. Denison et al. points out that research since the 1980s has shown that organizational culture impacts performance in four main ways:

- Creating an organization's sense of mission and direction that allows them to define organizational goals and strategies and to create a compelling vision of the organization's future.

- Building a high level of adaptability and flexibility to easily translate the demands of the organizational environment into action.

- Nurturing the involvement and engagement of their people to ensure a highly committed workforce with a sense of ownership and input into decisions that affect their work.

- Providing a consistency that is strongly rooted in a set of core values so that highly committed employees with a distinct method of doing business will be a powerful source of stability and internal integration.

Denison et al. argue that there exists an undeniable link between these four impacts of organizational culture and performance measures such as profitability, sales growth, quality, innovation, and market value (2012).

A strong organizational culture, however, is not always an organization's strongest asset. An organization's culture can either promote new strategies to attain goals or they can hinder them. An organization may change the goals they want to achieve, change the strategy to reach those goals, or change the way they prepare to enact their strategies, however, if they do not address the issue of culture (and its underlying effects on performance) that culture will act as a heavy anchor, preventing the organization from any real, long-term change or progress. Cameron and Quinn express this point saying, when an organization reengineers itself, if it does not fundamentally change its organizational culture,

> there is little hope of enduring improvement in organizational performance…This dependence of organizational improvement on culture change is due to the fact that when the values, orientations, definitions and goals stay constant…organizations return quickly to the status quo…without an alteration of the fundamental goals, values, and expectations of organizations or individuals, change remains superficial and of short duration. (2006, p. 11)

Sims seconds this notion, pointing out that

> changes in an organization's external environment often require changes in an organization's strategy. The existing organizational culture, though, has developed from a particular strategy, and members of the organization who are accustomed to that culture may resist changing the strategy. They may feel that such change will require changes in existing values and basic assumptions. (2002, p. 305)

This resistance to change can, undoubtedly, prevent any meaningful, and long-lasting, positive change for the betterment of the organization and its prospects of achieving its goals. As SF changes its strategy and mission focus and prepares for more indirect operations in uncertain and hostile future operating environments it may be postulated that the organizational culture must adapt as well. If the organizational culture does not change, it may retard the progress necessary to foster future success.

E.   OBJECTIVES AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS

The purpose of this study is to provide the U.S. Army Special Forces Regiment with pilot research into the condition of its organizational culture. For the purpose of this study the term "SF Regiment" will be used and will apply only to the five active-duty SFGs. Additionally this research will identify various aspects of that organizational culture at the ODA level which may hinder the organization's ability to build the skills necessary to succeed in conducting indirect operations in the future operating environment. This research is based on a less than fully representative cluster sample of SF soldiers; however interpretations can be drawn from the empirical data that will help determine the strengths, weaknesses, and orientation of the Regiments' organizational culture. Given this deficiency, this research will also propose recommendations for further research to confirm or deny the findings herein. Additionally, recommendations will be presented for ways to improve the current organizational culture in order to foster a higher degree of performance from Special Forces.

Special Forces Groups are currently adapting to the changes in the external operating environment that require changes in mission focus and training direction. Is the organizational culture of SF adapting to support the change in mission focus and future indirect utilization of forces?

- **Research Question 1:** What is the condition of the Special Forces Regiment's organizational culture currently?

- **Research Question 2:** What are some of the aspects of the Regiment's organizational culture that may prove a hindrance to mission accomplishment during indirect employment in future uncertain environments?

- **Research Question 3:** How can the SF Regiment implement approaches identified from organizational culture literature to improve the organizational cultures of the SFGs in order to foster a culture that supports the goals of the Regiment?

F.   STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS

This thesis begins with the statement of the problem, a description of the concept of organizational culture and its role in organizational performance (Chapter I). Chapter

II expands upon SF's changing environment, the associated changes in strategy and goals and necessary changes in training. Additionally, Chapter II discusses the role SF's organizational culture plays in its organizational performance. Chapter II concludes with the methodology of gathering empirical data to determine answers to the research questions above. Chapter III displays the results and analysis of the data gathered. Chapter IV provides a summary of findings, presents recommendations for further research and recommendations for action that will improve the organizational culture of the Regiment.

II. SPECIAL FORCES' FUTURE AND ASSESSING THE ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE FIT

A. INTRODUCTION:

U.S. Army Special Forces are currently transitioning from being utilized in a mainly direct manner to more of an indirect role: conducting FID and Partner Nation Capacity Building throughout the globe. However, for over a decade, SF has grown accustomed to conducting the business of war in a kinetic manner and may have created an informal organizational culture to help the Groups adapt to and survive the external environmental challenges brought about by such application. When an organization's mission or strategy changes, however, organizational culture can either have a positive effect on the organization; promoting the required changes and achieving the new goals, or a negative effect; preventing the organization from taking the crucial steps required to meet the goals. It is useful therefore, to assess and measure the organizational culture and determine if cultural change is necessary in order to facilitate mission success.

This chapter will expand on the guidance for future SF employment as outlined by higher headquarters and discuss more in depth the relationship between SF's organizational culture and the skills necessary to prepare for the future operating environment.

B. THE PROBLEM EXPANDED

1. USSOCOM

As Chapter I outlines, the SF Regiment is currently undergoing a change in mission focus. What follows is an expansion of USSOCOM and USASOC visions, strategies, and goals SF will enact to ensure the Regiment promotes national security through its operations across the globe.

USSOCOM has six key elements of this strategy: Understanding the human domain, understanding and influencing the narrative, enduring engagement through small-footprint distributed operations, building sustainable partner capacity and interoperability, managing the network, and building resilience into the force and families

(USSOCOM, 2013). These operational approaches will be enabled by developing SOF forces' ability to gain and maintain certain capabilities. SOF will sustain the Global SOF Network, be cultural and regional experts, improve the information environment, conduct reduced-signature operations, expand authorities, enhance the capability of SOF enablers, and utilize advanced technologies (USSOCOM, 2013).

USASOC generates two different but mutually supporting forms of special operations

Special Warfare

UW
FID
PSYOP
CMO

"Designed to wade into uncertainty… and prevail"

Units capable of conducting sabotage, subversion and insurgent activities for extended periods in denied areas and advising, assisting and training partner-nation forces in COIN & Special Operations.

"Built to squeeze out uncertainty… then execute"

Units trained and equipped to provide a primarily unilateral, scalable, direct-action capability that are skilled in hostage rescue, kill/capture operations against designated targets and other specialized tasks.

Surgical Strike

CT
CP
DA
Recovery Operations

1st, 3rd, 5th, 7th, 10th, 19th, 20th Special Forces Groups (Airborne)

Combatant Commander In-Extremis Force

Special Missions Unit

75th Ranger Regiment

160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment

95th Civil Affairs Brigade (Airborne)

4th, 8th, Military Information Support Operations Groups (Airborne)

528th Sustainment Brigade (Special Operations - Airborne)

Figure 1.   USASOC Force Missions (from USASOC, 2013)

2.   USASOC

As a subordinate unit of USSOCOM, USASOC has also presented a way forward for U.S. Army Special Operations Forces. In ARSOF 2022, LTG Cleveland, the USASOC Commander, states his vision:

> [ARSOF will] provide our nation the world's premier special operations units, capable of prosecuting the most sensitive special warfare campaigns

and executing the most difficult surgical strike operations, while providing seamless and persistent special operations support to join-force commanders worldwide. (ARSOF 2022, 2013, p. 17)

Figure 1 presents the foundational concepts for the entirety of U.S. Army Special Operations Forces. Of note is that the SFGs lean heavily to the left side of the chart, the SW side. This is where USASOC sees SF's greatest utility to the nation as well as where the Regiment fits in the operationalization of USASOC's vision; conducting UW, FID, and other SW, or, indirect operations.

However, USASOC has identified some critical gaps in capabilities and areas that require focus for ARSOF to accomplish the "special warfare" role. Chief among those gaps is the ability to wage unconventional warfare, which USASOC says has been degraded over the last decade of war and requires new emphasis and training focus. ARSOF 2022 highlights this point saying, "…this will require a paradigm shift and an assessment of the historic role of SOF versus the more publicized role our force assumed over the last decade" (ARSOF 2022, 2013, pp. 13–14). Additionally, USASOC points out that in order to be successful, ARSOF must integrate more fully with U.S. Army conventional forces and interagency efforts to accomplish USASOC goals and National Security objectives. More than a simple re-focusing of effort, however USASOC says, "the soldiers in our special warfare units must recognize that their value lies not only in their lethality, but in the fact that they are trained, educated, led, equipped and organized in unique ways to meet the demands of an uncertain future" (ARSOF 2022, 2013, p. 13).

To summarize the above strategies for change, SF will need to increase its capability to conduct special warfare activities and integrate more fully with interagency and conventional forces. Additionally, SF must be prepared to play a major role in the establishment of the Global SOF Network through its interaction with foreign forces. In order to do this, SF must refocus training efforts to prepare for FID and UW missions as well as build its capability for relationship building, both of US and foreign partners. This research is designed to identify and diagnose the condition of the organizational culture of SF and determine if that culture is a hindrance to achieving high degrees of performance in relation to these changes in mission focus.

Specifically, this research will focus on how SF's organizational culture hinders or promotes the Regiment's ability to play a strong role in building the Global SOF Network, conduct SW operations such as FID and UW as effectively as possible, and integrate with CF and interagency elements to improve operational success; all elements of higher headquarters' vision and goals for the future. Additionally, this study will discover what aspects of the organizational culture prevent SF from being as effective as possible in their execution of SW missions such as FID and UW. Some of the non-lethal skills required in SW, specifically for UW and FID operations will be extracted from doctrine and discussed below.

3.   Requirements Outlined in Doctrine

As stated above, indirect application of SF will be the norm in the future. This shift in mission focus requires a shift in the manner in which SF conduct business. In order to determine some of the nuances of what SF will have to do in the future, or what attributes it must possess to be successful, it is important to look at the doctrinal documents that pertain to the missions that will be the focus of the future. Much of the emphasis of this research will be on the effects of the current organizational culture in relation to SF's ability to gain or increase the attributes and skills described below.

FM 3-18: Special Forces Operations lists several "characteristics" of Special Forces that allow the SFGs to succeed in uncertain environments. Of note from those characteristics are the ability of SF Units to have regional orientation, have excellent cross cultural communication skills, be culturally astute, understand the nuances of foreign languages, and be skilled in operating in the Joint, Interagency, and political arenas (2012).

ADP 3-05: Special Operations says, "Special Operations forces are unique in the execution of their operations because of their skills in the conduct of people-oriented operations" (2012, p. 13). This document seconds the characteristics from FM 3-18 described above; listing attributes such as language trained, regionally aligned, culturally

astute, politically nuanced, trained in negotiation and mediation and proficient in inter-organizational coordination as the qualities that allow SF soldiers to carry out special warfare activities. (2012)

As FID and UW missions acquire greater attention from commanders, this research turns to doctrine specific to these mission which further highlight the importance of non-lethal skills that are requirements for successful execution of future SW operations. ATP 3-05.1: Unconventional Warfare says, "It is impossible to overstate the importance of foreign language proficiency as a key competency to conduct UW" (ATP 3-05-1, 2013, p. B3). Furthermore, it condemns those who do not strive for language competency saying such a, "demonstrated lack of such motivation, self-discipline, and curiosity is a key indicator of unsuitability and lack of aptitude for UW" (ATP 3-05-1, 2013, B2).

The Foreign Internal Defense Field Manual, FM 3-05.2, states, "as a force multiplier, SF units maintain advanced skills and capabilities (such as language) that enable them to conduct advisory operations with the HN for extended periods of time" (2011, p. 2-18). The document further states, "a FID operation can be critically disabled within the first few moments of contact with [Host Nation (HN)] military, civilian officials, or even ordinary citizens, if vital cultural mores are violated by U.S. personnel" (2011, p. 4-3). Essentially, these two documents stress the importance of two skills, language and cultural knowledge, to the successful accomplishment of FID and UW missions. Though there are many other tasks associated with these operations, these two skills will be referred to often during the discussion of empirical findings in Chapter III. As these are "vital" skills, many of the survey questions revolve around determining if the organizational culture fosters or hinders the building of these skills on the ODAs.

It is true that SF is second to none in conducting operations alongside foreign counterparts. However, through personal experience and informal discussions with former ODA members and fellow SF officers it has become apparent that many officers and soldiers within the Regiment are not motivated to acquire the non-lethal skills outlined above which are vital to the indirect operations most likely to be conducted. The reason for the lack of motivation is an informal organizational culture that has developed

as SF deployed to, survived, and performed successfully during multiple years of direct combat utilization. This organizational culture focuses more on the direct application of forces in combat environments and places a premium on expertise at the lethal skills.

C.   ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE APPLIED TO SPECIAL FORCES

As discussed previously, in order to be as successful as possible, organizations—leaders and members alike—must manage and shape effective organizational cultures that are the right fit for the goals the organization is trying to achieve. Without an understanding of SF's organizational culture, it may prove difficult to implement new missions and expect the same level of motivation, training focus, dedication, and excellence which are ultimately what has allowed SF to successfully accomplish its combat missions in the past. In order to describe how the concept of organizational culture applies to Special Forces, the following will provide examples of SF culture in relation to Schein's levels of organizational culture. Then I will provide an understanding of the functions that SF's organizational culture plays in the Regiment's performance.

1.   Levels of Special Forces' Organizational Culture

As stated in Chapter I, organizational culture can be witnessed in three levels: artifacts, espoused values, and assumptions. The following figure and discussion describes these levels in relation to the Special Forces Regiment.

Levels of Culture	Description	Examples in SF
Artifacts	Visible structures and processes	Team rooms, professional language, green berets, SFAS
Espoused Values	Strategies, goals, philosophies	"By, With, Through" "Designed to wade into uncertainty and prevail" Language/cultural expertise
Basic Assumptions	Taken-for-granted beliefs, perceptions, thoughts and feelings (ultimate source of values and action	Prioritization of training time/resources Feelings about importance of non-lethal skills Perception of partner forces

Figure 2.　Levels of Culture (after Schein, 1995)

As shown in Figure 2, artifacts are easily identifiable aspects of SF's organizational culture. The distinctive "green beret" headgear or the Special Forces Motto—"De Oppresso Liber"—are excellent examples of artifacts. Other examples include the internal processes for presenting mission briefs, concept of operations (CONOPs), and routing administrative paper work. While it is important to point out what artifacts of the SF organizational culture are, this research will focus little on them as they are often unchangeable in the military. For example, military uniforms and customs and courtesies are all aspects of the larger U.S. Army culture and cannot be changed by the regiment. Items such as the layout of workspaces or the computing infrastructure are very slow to change and are often not in the budget to do so. However, Chapter IV will recommend further areas of research into SF's organizational culture and subsequent studies should research these artifacts for a more complete understanding of the SF organizational culture.

The items identified above, both the strategies outlined by USSOCOM and USASOC as well as the "characteristics" of Special Forces posed by doctrine are the espoused values of SF. These values, in a strong organizational culture, should be widely held by leaders and soldiers alike. These espoused values are what SF believes sets it apart from other military units and what allows it to be successful in conducting missions to support the National Security of America. Essentially, the espoused values of SF are

the ways that when coupled with the means will achieve the ends for Special Forces. Various espoused values will be tested in this research.

While the research will not test the validity or importance of these espoused values, it will test the degree to which those in the Regiment place worth in the espoused values and translate that worth into action by training and preparing to operate in a manner congruent with these values.

The basic underlying assumptions in the Special Forces' organizational culture are what really drive training, mission planning, preparation and execution. The assumptions are based in the deeply rooted perceptions and beliefs of the SF soldiers about how to behave, how to train, and how to operate on missions. This study will uncover what basic assumptions drive preparations for mission execution. Specifically, this study will focus on those assumptions that are either useful or disadvantageous in attaining the non-lethal skills required of ODAs for success in the future special warfare environments they are likely to be deployed.

2.   SF Performance

The link between strong, positive, organizational cultures and increased organizational performance has been outlined in Chapter I. However, what is crucial to this research is an understanding of what organizational performance is in relation to SF. Firstly, it should be noted that the terms "performance" and "effectiveness" often have varying definitions in relation to the study of organizations. Both are commonly used to describe the effects of an organization's culture on the organization's ability to reach its goals. For this study, both terms will be used interchangeably.

Some may argue that military performance may simply be the degree to which the mission is accomplished, or the measurement of organizational agility and efficiency (Kropp, Zolin, & Lindsay, 2007). While these measurements are indeed important, the performance of SF cannot be measured so easily as the ramifications of what the organization does, or fails to do, can be quite immense (Druckman, Singer, & Cott 1997). Therefore, a more in-depth definition of performance must be addressed.

Millet, Murray, and Watman (1986) assess military performance by four unique measurements of effectiveness at each of the levels at which military activity occurs: political, strategic, operational and tactical. Political effectiveness is the ability to gain political support from the national government in order to procure military resources and expand its opportunities to conduct its activities (Millet, Murray, & Watman, 1986). Examples of political effectiveness for SF might include the gaining of Congressional support for the acquisition of funds to support personnel health programs or SOF-specific equipment acquisition initiatives. It may also mean garnering political support for expansion of authorities.

The strategic level of military effectiveness refers to the degree to which armed forces secure the strategic objectives that are linked to national security goals. (Millet et al., 1986) The operational effectiveness measurement refers to the development of institutional concepts and doctrine for employing major forces to achieve strategic objectives within a theater of war. Tactical effectiveness is the measurement of military activity that successfully conducts tactical engagements (lethal and non-lethal) in order to secure operational objectives. (Millet et al., 1986) This level is more easily identifiable for SF operations. For example, does an ODA effectively train its foreign counterparts on specific tasks during a FID deployment? Does an ODA destroy key nodes of an insurgent network during a raid in Afghanistan?

These measures are important to understand as the outcomes of SF operations have an impact on SF's ability to garner more political support, are the ways of accomplishing strategic and operational ends, and have direct and obvious tactical effects on both friendly and enemy forces. The organizational culture of SF plays a direct role in determining to what degree the SFGs are effective in these four respects. For example, if the organizational culture is one that does not emphasize high levels of foreign cultural knowledge, an ODA may, as quoted above from FM 3-05.2, create an incident by violating cultural norms of the HN. That incident has the possibility of decreasing all levels of effectiveness if it is serious enough to be considered an international incident. However, if the organizational culture is one that places a premium on cultural awareness and other such useful values, the chances are decreased such an incident will occur at all.

3.   Assessing and Measuring SF's Organizational Culture

As discussed in Chapter I, as organizations change their strategy their organizational culture must change as well. For SF, this means as its change in mission focus goes from more direct, combat focus to more indirect, Special Warfare focus, the previously established culture must adapt as well to foster the accomplishment of the Regiment's goals. In order to change the organizational culture, one must first know what the current culture is, what its strengths and weaknesses are and only then can the Regiment implement change initiatives to increase the strength and the fit of the organizational culture so that it may foster a higher level of performance in the future operating environment.

Cameron and Quinn present three basic methods that can be used to measure and organization's culture:

> A holistic approach in which the investigator becomes a participant in the organization; allowing for in-depth monitoring of the culture.

> Metaphorical or language approaches, where the researcher uses language in documents, correspondence, conversations and stories to uncover cultural patterns.

> Quantitative approaches in which the researcher uses questionnaires or interviews to uncover certain dimensions of culture. (2006, p. 148)

However, Druckman et al. propose that when finding similarities amongst many organizational cultures (each SFG presumably has their own unique culture) a quantitative approach must be used (1997). One way to accurately measure organizational culture is to construct surveys based on a researcher's ethnographic observations in order to ensure the survey items accurately reflect the aspects of the culture studied (Druckman et al., 1997). This method essentially blends the holistic and quantitative approaches to measure organizational culture. Since the purpose of this study is to find trends in the organizational culture of the SF Regiment as a whole (which includes each active duty SFG), it is essential to gather quantitative data. To account for the necessary ethnographic observations, I have over 4.5 years of time at an SFG and over seven years in Special Forces. My personal observations of the SF organizational

culture were used as the basis for the questions in the supplemental questionnaire that compliments the Denison Organizational Culture Survey (DOCS). As Figure 3 shows when these two survey items are coupled, the analysis of the data they provide should lead to an accurate depiction of the overall organizational culture of Special Forces as well as provide insight into the values and underlying assumptions about aspects of ODAs, such as training priorities, that will determine if the organizational culture is one that supports high performance in the future.

Figure 3.   Research Method and Purpose

To this end, this research will illuminate trends, based on the cluster sample of subjects, in the overall condition and strength of the Regiment's organizational culture by utilizing a tested method of measuring organizational culture, the DOCS. This measurement tool has been developed by Denison Consulting based on decades of research in the field of organizational culture. Chapter III will go into more detail about the DOCS. Insights into whether the current organizational culture hinders the building of key skills required of SF soldiers during the execution of indirect operations will be

measured by a supplemental questionnaire. The aspects of the organizational culture measured in the supplemental questionnaire have been derived from what doctrine or senior SOF commanders have identified as important traits or skills that a critical for mission success. When analysis from these mutually supporting questionnaires is coupled together, this research will paint an overall picture that will answer the question: Is the current organizational culture of the Special Forces Regiment a hindrance to its ability to perform as optimally as possible in the future?

Though Chapter III will provide further detail, it should be noted that this research is based on a convenient cluster sample that does not adequately represent the entirety of the Special Forces regiment. Additionally, while this research brings to light many possible issues regarding the ways the current SF organizational culture may hinder the Regiment's ability to be as successful as possible, it is not to be considered an all-encompassing analysis of that organizational culture. This point will be expanded upon later and recommendations for more in-depth research will be provided in Chapter IV.

III. EMPIRICAL RESEARCH

A. INTRODUCTION

As Chapter II discussed, there are three main questions this research addresses:

- What is the condition of the current SF Regiment organizational culture?

- To what degree does the current organizational culture focus on direct application of SF ODAs?

- Do certain aspects of the current organizational culture at the ODA level hinder or promote the building of skillsets necessary for success during missions in the future operating environment?

In order to answer these questions, empirical data was gathered utilizing a survey. The first part of the survey, the Denison Organizational Culture Survey will answer Question 1 by providing a complete picture of SF's overall current organizational culture. Part 2 of the survey, the supplemental questionnaire, will provide answers to Questions 2 and 3. Both parts of the survey will offer unique insights into aspects of the organizational culture both at the higher, SF Group level and at the ODA level, which may be improved upon in order to provide a more positive organizational culture that will foster greater performance for SF in the future.

Though the results will be discussed in detail below, it is important to note that the main results show SF has several aspects of its organizational culture that require improvement. Chief among those at the Regimental level of analysis is a lack of SF soldiers' understanding of the SFGs' vision, goals, and strategies of employing the forces to accomplish the objectives. Additionally, analysis will show a lack of understanding of the role SF plays in the larger DOD and Interagency approach to a whole of government solution to increase national security. At the ODA level, analysis will show that while a shift in mission focus is acknowledged, the beliefs, norms, and collective actions necessary to refocus training to meet the new objectives are not being conducted.

As stated previously in this work, a simple random sample of subjects was impossible to obtain. Therefore, a cluster sample of subjects was used to gather the data analyzed below. This research is not meant to be wholly representative of the SF

Regiment. However since the respondents are officers or senior NCOs-the new generation of mid-level leadership-and the sample covers all active SFGs, their opinions and the trends shown should not be discounted due to the small cluster sample. This research should be accepted as an informative pilot study; the proverbial canary in the coalmine. It will act as the first illumination of issues that if not further studied and addressed may pose serious consequences to the readiness and effectiveness of the force, and serves as a call for deeper and more systematic research into these issues.

A survey was distributed to Special Forces qualified officers and NCOs assigned to the Naval Postgraduate School to collect quantitative and qualitative data. The Denison Organizational Culture Survey (DOCS) utilized a series of closed-ended questions while several supplemental questions, designed by the researcher, used both open and closed-ended questions to gather data regarding the organizational culture of Special Forces Groups.

B. DATA COLLECTION PROCESS

1. Respondents

The U.S. Army Special Forces qualified personnel assigned to the Naval Postgraduate School made up the sample population for this research. Giving the survey to students at the Naval Postgraduate School reduced the risk of biased answers due to any undue command influences that gathering the same data from soldiers currently a part of the Special Forces Groups may have produced.


Figure 4.   Distribution of Ranks Surveyed

As shown in Figure 4, the majority of subjects held the rank of major. The subjects averaged 34 years old and had 12.5 years of active service in the Army. Of those active duty years, a mean average of six were spent in Special Forces with an average four and a half years at their SF Groups with an average of three of those years on the SF ODA. Each SF Group was represented in the sample with the lowest number of subjects being formerly of 3rd SF Group (seven subjects) and the highest formerly of 10th SF Group (16 subjects). On average, the subjects had conducted over three combat deployments and two non-combat deployments (JCETs, JCS, CNT, etc.). As stated previously, a majority of respondents have had additional duty positions following ODA time as well as many with additional duty stations following their time at a SF Group. The average amount of time that passed since the subjects left their SF Group and took the survey was 17.8 months with an average time away from their ODAs of 32.3 months. These time spans are significant for the purposes of this research because it may be argued that this research, due to the fact the subjects have not been in their SF Group for over a year, may not accurately represent the current organizational culture of the SF Groups.

Regardless, this approach still has merit in that it shows a snapshot of the Regiment's organizational culture during the time period these subjects served in their SF Groups and presents significant issues that SF's leadership must be aware of in order to prevent back-sliding and reversal of the progress to the organizational culture that may have been made in the interim period.

A total of 55 of the available 58 officers and NCOs participated in the research by taking the DOCS survey, however only 54 participated in the supplemental questions. This is a 93 percent participation rate amongst the cluster sample of the qualified population at NPS. However, as stated previously, the subjects make up only a cluster sample of the total population of the Special Forces active duty SFGs. This presents an issue with the generalizability of the results. However, the results are not meant to make firm inferences to the underlying population, but rather serve as an illumination of possible issues. As stated above, while the sample may not provide adequate data regarding the whole of the Regiment, conclusions will be based on the assumption that it

provides valuable insight. Chapter IV will propose further research suggestions that will help the Regiment confirm or deny the findings of this pilot study.

2. Survey Instrument

a. *Denison Organizational Culture Survey*

The Denison Organizational Culture Survey is based on the Denison Model that explores four traits of organizational culture that, according to Denison, directly link to high organizational performance (Denison, Hooijberg, Lane, Lief, 2012). As discussed in Chapter II, the DOCS utilizes 60, Likert scale questions to determine the strength and weaknesses of on organization's culture. Subjects respond from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree) on the survey questions which measure four basic traits of organizational culture, broken down into three indices per trait. Denison consulting has gathered and analyzed over a decade's worth of empirical data that directly links higher scores in these four traits to overall high degrees of organizational performance. Those four traits and their associated indices follow and are represented in Figure 5:

Figure 5.   Traits and Indices Based on the Denison Model of High Performance Circumplex (from Denison et al., 2012)

Mission: a clear sense of purpose and direction that allows organizations to define their goals and strategies and to create a vision for the organization's future.

Indices:

- Strategic direction and intent: Do employees understand the organization's key strategies?

- Goals and objectives: Do short term goals exist that link the day to day activities of employees to the vision, mission, and strategy of the organization? Are those goals ambitious yet realistic?

- Vision: Do employees understand the vision, its implications on their work and does that vision excite and motivate employees?

Adaptability: a high degree of flexibility and responsiveness to the operational environment.

Indices:

- Creating change: Does the organization look for new ways to improve the way it does business? Do the employees identify changes to the work environment and react accordingly?

- Customer focus: Does the organization understand the needs of the customers it serves and is customer focus a primary concern throughout the organization? Are employees committed to responding to the customers changing requirements?

- Organizational learning: Does the organization create an environment where calculated risk taking and innovation can occur and does the organization place importance on learning? Does the organization share the learned information from successful and failed experiences across the entire organization?

Involvement: The extent to which the organization empowers and engages their workforce, build their organization around teams, and develop human capability at all levels.

Indices:

- Empowerment: Do employees feel informed and involved in their work and do they feel they can positively impact the organization?

- Team orientation: Do employees collaborate and feel mutually responsible for achieving objectives? Does the organization encourage and practice teamwork?

- Capability development: Does the organization invest in the skills of the employees and are those skills improving? Does the organization have the skills necessary to perform at a high success rate currently and in the future?

Consistency: An integrated consistent set of behaviors, rooted in core values and the degree to which the organization puts these values into action.

Indices:

- Core values: Do organizational leaders model and reinforce a set of values that create a strong sense of identity and a clear set of behavioral norms? Do employees share the same set of values?

- Agreement: Can employees compromise and work through challenges in a constructive manner? Is the organization capable of reaching agreement on key issues?

- Integration: Do employees from different parts of the organization share a common perspective which allows them to cross organizational boundaries to work with one another for the betterment of the organization as a whole? (Denison Consulting, 2012)

b.   *Supplemental Questions*

Supplemental questions were designed to identify trends in aspects of the organizational cultures of the SF Groups. Specifically, the supplemental questions gather data concerning the deeply rooted assumptions, norms, and beliefs of ODAs in relation to the shift in mission focus of Special Operations/Special Forces discussed in Chapter I. These questions illuminate the degree to which the changes to the strategies, goals, visions, and foreseeable missions of USASOC and USSOCOM are or are not transforming the assumptions, norms, beliefs, and values at the ODA level. It is important to restate two points from Chapter I. First, when organizations change their strategy and goals, the organizational culture must adapt to support the new strategy or achieve the new goals. Second, for the organization to be as effective as possible at achieving its

goals and gaining or maintaining a high level of performance, the organizational culture must be strong and foster such results.

The supplemental questions are presented in three categories, Future Mission and Direction, Training, and Rewards and Desires. Each category is further divided into various subsections. The supplemental questionnaire poses a mix of 55 multiple choice, fill in the blank, and scaled questions.

C.   SURVEY IMPLEMENTATION AND DATA COLLECTION

Paper-pencil-surveys, along with a consent form, were issued face-to-face from the researcher to subjects. A brief was given to subjects regarding the instructions for taking the survey and the research objectives. Subjects were told to recall only their experiences in their former SF Group for purposes of answering the survey and the supplemental questions. This point was significant to make to subjects because many of the subjects had postings outside the SF Group after their initial SF Group tour but before attending the Naval Postgraduate School. It was critical that all subjects only answer questions from the survey in relation to their experiences at their Special Forces Group as any follow-on learning could not be accurately accounted for and was not necessary to this research. Last, subjects were instructed to take the surveys individually.

Data for the DOCS was collected by the researcher and packaged in Excel. This data was then sent to Denison Consulting for analysis and production of only the circumplex report. All further evaluation of the results was conducted by the researcher.

The following section will describe the trends that emerged from both the DOCS and the supplemental questionnaire in relation to the entire SF Regiment.

D.   ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION OF RESULTS

1.   Denison Organizational Culture Survey

The Circumplex report in Figure 6 displays the sample's results in each of the twelve indices of the Denison Organizational Culture Survey. The scores represent SF's performance compared to the other organizations in Denison's Global Database and the

results are shown as a percentile. For example in the Vision index, depicted in Figure 6, SF scored in the 10th percentile. This means they scored higher than ten percent of the organizations in the Denison Global Database.

Figure 6.   Denison Organizational Culture Survey (DOCS) Results Special Forces Regiment (from Denison Consulting, 2014)

In the Denison model, highly successful performing organizations have high percentile scores in each of the four dimensions and 12 indices. In essence, higher percentile scores in each index are better, and more balance throughout the entire graph is better.

Though Special Forces scored high in two traits (5/6 indices) it scored relatively low on the overall DOCS. Generally, the analysis shows SF's organizational culture is likely hindering its ability to operate as effectively as possible to achieve its highest level of performance. Overall, respondents scored very low on both Adaptability and Mission traits, however scored at least higher than 50 percent of organizations in the Denison Global Database in all three indices that make up the Involvement trait and two of the three indices that make up the Consistency trait.

a. *Analysis by Trait and Index*

(1) Adaptability: Figure 7 displays the DOCS results in the Adaptability trait.

Figure 7.   DOCS Results of Adaptability Trait
(from Denison Consulting, 2014)

Special Forces scored the lowest on the Adaptability trait of the DOCS. In fact, the lowest overall percentile score of the entire DOCS was in the Customer Service index of this trait. The low score in this index reveal that the respondents do not have a clear understanding of U.S. Army and Interagency (the specified "customers") requirements and are not fully comfortable with the current level of interaction those customers have with SF. Only five percent of respondents gave a "strongly agree" or "agree" response to the question, "All members have a deep understanding of U.S. Army and Interagency wants and needs." This is significant in that it shows SF soldiers do not understand where they, and their unique skills, fit into the larger Army, DOD, and Interagency missions to secure the nation. As Special Forces will undoubtedly work more closely with Interagency partners and as SF and conventional force integration becomes the norm, this aspect of SF's organizational culture will likely hinder its ability to effectively operate with these entities unless changed.

The Organizational Learning index received a 12 percentile score which shows that respondents believe that the process of learning through innovation and risk taking is

lacking within the Regiment. Additionally, this low score implies that what learning does take place is not being communicated to other parts of the Regiment or SF Group

The highest percentile score for this trait was in the Creating Change index, with 21 percentile. Though 21 is not a high percentile score, it does show that more emphasis at the SF Groups is placed on flexibility and responsiveness to changes in the operating environment. The lowest level of agreement was given to the question, "The way things are done is very flexible and easy to change." The strongest level of agreement was given to the question, "New and improved ways to do work are continually adopted." Though the scores to these questions seem at odds with each other, the data may suggest that while SF Groups constantly seek and implement new ways of conducting training and operations, once accepted as the norm, there seems little room for change. The positive side of this analysis is that if the appropriate standard operating procedures, ones that foster the attainment of goals and objectives for the organization, are instituted they will easily become the norm and will ultimately become part of the organization's culture.

(2)   Mission: Figure 8 displays the DOCS results in the Mission trait.

Figure 8.   DOCS Results of Mission Trait (from Denison Consulting, 2014)

Responses in the Mission trait were low for all three indices. Overall this presents a challenge for SF as it shows that the majority of respondents do not have a clear understanding of SF's vision and its strategies to reach its objectives in the future. The data also suggests that the respondents do not perceive a clear link in how their day to day activities play a coordinated role in the achievement of their SF Group's goals.

The lowest score was in the Vision index with ten percentile. This low score signifies that the Regiment's vision for the future is not fully understood. Additionally, it shows that long-term goals of the SF Groups are often pushed aside for the betterment of short term goals. This data may be based in part on the fact that the indirect operations many of the respondents believe SF should be conducting (see Supplemental Questions) have been compromised by a more direct operational usage during the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Empirical evidence of this assumption was not tested in this research, however.

The data shows that SF soldiers know their commanders have a long-term vision, however this vision does not excite the soldiers. This may simply be a misunderstanding of the commander's vision, or it may be that the soldiers do not believe the future operations they will undertake will be intrinsically rewarding. If the latter is the case then obviously this aspect of SF's organizational culture will hinder its future ability to perform at the highest degree.

The Strategic Direction and Intent index received a percentile score of 16. This low score reinforces the notion that the strategic direction of SF is not fully understood by the respondents. The respondents are not able to clearly identify the long term purpose of their SF Groups.

The Goals and Objectives index also received a score of 16 percentile. Respondents do not perceive clear links between the vision, strategy, long-term and short-term goals and the missions and training their ODAs conduct. Since the question, "The leadership has 'gone on record' about the objectives we are trying to meet" received the highest level of agreement, but the question, "There is widespread agreement about the SF Group's goals" received the lowest, there seems to be disparity between what the leadership believes the goals of the organization are, or should be, compared to the widespread beliefs of those under their command. A reason for this disparity is discovered and discussed in the supplemental questions below.

The reason for the low scores in these two indices may be in part due to the changing nature of the mission focus that currently is transforming the way SF operates. While many of the operations in the last decade were direct, combat operations, and very

easily linked to higher headquarters' objectives, many others (JCETs, JCS, CNTs, etc.) were may not have been so clearly or directly linked to a higher headquarters objectives or initiatives. Higher headquarters in the Regiment understands that SF cannot be everywhere, at all times. Those commanders understand that using their precious few resources need to result in achieving the most effective outcomes. However, as SF changes the mission focus to a more indirect role, and as it is more selective in where its forces are allocated, it is imperative to ensure the linkage between the mission and the intermediate and long term goals are effectively communicated and understood by the ODAs who will undertake the missions.

(3) Consistency: Figure 9 displays the DOCS results in the Consistency trait.

Figure 9. DOCS Results of Consistency Trait
(from Denison Consulting, 2014)

Respondents scored the overall Consistency trait relatively highly, with two of the three indices receiving scores above the 50 percentile. Overall, therefore, the respondents feel that strong values are in place. Also there is an overall feeling of agreement on key issues and about the right way to do business that allows the SF Groups to achieve their missions and goals.

The Core Values index received a 51 percentile score and shows that not only are a strong set of core values in place and adhered to amongst the SF Group but also that leaders practice what they preach and that everyone follows an ethical code that prevents the unit from bringing trouble upon itself.

The highest percentile score, 74, was in the Agreement index. This shows a strong aspect of the organization's culture which is the ability to solve problems. When issues arise, the respondents believe consensus is easy to achieve because members of the SF Group know what the right thing to do is. When the proper action to be taken is unclear, the respondents believe members of their SF Group work hard to compromise and achieve win-win solutions. Additionally, over 80 percent of respondents said they "agree" or "strongly agree" to the following statement, "There is a 'strong' culture of your SF Group." While this, in itself, is a positive, if that culture is not helping the organization move in the right direction, such a strong culture can be a hindrance to the overall effectiveness of the organization.

The low score in the Coordination and Integration index (23 percentile) shows the issues many of the respondents have working across other parts of their SF Groups. Over 50 percent of respondents said it was hard to coordinate projects across different parts of the SF Group. The data suggests roadblocks, either formal or informal, are in place and prevent smooth synchronization and integration throughout the SF Group.

(4) Involvement: Figure 10 displays the DOCS results in the Involvement trait.

Figure 10. DOCS Results of Involvement Trait
(from Denison Consulting, 2014)

41

Special Forces scored very well on the three indices that make up the Involvement index. The respondents overwhelmingly believe the Regiment has provided and developed the necessary tools and skills and given them the power and autonomy to get the job done. These positive aspects of SF's organizational culture seem to be the bedrock of SF's current ability to effectively accomplish the missions it is assigned. This is no surprise as SF was established to and currently does recruit highly skilled operators who conduct missions with small teams of highly trained, empowered soldiers and succeed in extreme operational environments.

The high score in the Capability Development index (62 percent) signifies the continued emphasis that the Regiment places on selecting, training, developing and mentoring highly capable soldiers. Additionally, it shows the widely held belief that the organization has the ability to improve its capabilities and strives to do so.

The Team Orientation index scored highly as well (71 percent) and signifies, as mentioned above, the strong reliance on small teams to achieve results. This, again, is an excellent quality the Regiment possess and is the primary building block on which a track record of success has been developed.

Lastly, the Empowerment index scored 78 percent, the highest score on the DOCS. This index shows the degree to which respondents believe that not only are most SF soldiers involved in their own jobs, but that those soldiers are involved in the planning processes as well. This fact corresponds to the empowerment SF has given to their ODAs as tactical training, planning, and mission execution tend to be conducted at the lower levels. Additionally, and most importantly, the respondents expressed that they can have a positive impact on the mission. Again, this aspect of the organization's culture is deeply rooted and derives from the long tradition that humans are more important than hardware in SOF operations.

The Involvement trait seems to be the bedrock on which SF currently succeeds and will continue to succeed regardless of the outcome and analysis of the other traits measured on the DOCS. However, what the aggregate data from each trait shows is that while SF Groups have been succeeding by relying on the strength of the ODAs (and other

small elements) there is room for improvement in other areas that could increase the degree to which the overall organizational culture could facilitate mission success in the future. Though SF has made great achievements over the last decade and contributed immeasurably to the security of the United States, if the organizational culture fostered greater effectiveness and higher performance the Regiment could possibly support National Security to an even greater degree.

2. Supplemental Questions

The supplemental questions measure various norms, values, assumptions, and beliefs of the subjects in relation to three categories; Future Mission and Direction, Training, and Rewards and Desires. The analysis of the results is broken down into these categories though many questions will show trends that span the categories. The results will be discussed as they relate to the Special Forces Regiment as a whole. Additionally, the analysis of the trends from the supplemental questions will be matched, where applicable, to the outcome of the DOCS.

a. *Future Mission and Direction*

This section, containing 15 questions, measures perceptions concerning the presence of the shift in mission focus, as discussed in Chapter I, from a more direct combat role to a more indirect role that Special Forces will play in conducting future operations.

(1) Perceptions of Mission Focus Shift

Six questions in this subsection pertain to perceptions on the shift in mission focus from direct to indirect utilization of SF.

When asked if subjects perceive a change in mission focus, and to which area, 59 percent replied they indeed saw a change in mission focus and believed UW to have more emphasis within their SF BN or SFG (See Figure 11). Nearly a quarter (24 percent) believed FID to be the new mission focus. Only seven percent believed Direct Action was the new mission focus, with seven percent believing there was no change at all.

Perception of BN or SFG Change in Mission Focus

- More FID Focus: 13
- More UW Focus: 32
- More DA Focus: 4
- I Don't Believe My Unit Is Changing Focus: 4
- Other: 1

Figure 11.   Perception of BN or SFG Change in Mission Focus

To support the above perceptions, subjects were asked which SF mission soldiers under their command are most likely to conduct in the next decade. 89 percent responded that FID would be most likely undertaken the most over the coming decade while COIN and UW scored the other 11 percent together. It is important to note that not a single subject believed the more direct action mission, SR, HR, DA, CT would be undertaken the most.

When asked if a shift in mission focus was required, 69 percent agreed to a higher level. When this is coupled with the data above, it shows the majority of those surveyed believe SF's strategic utility is better served by the current change in mission focus to indirect operations other than direct combat.

When asked if the subjects believed that a majority of the members of their ODB identified the shift in mission focus from direct to indirect operations, 52 percent said either yes, everyone, or the majority of everyone, in their OBD believed there was a change in mission focus. 32 percent said some members of their ODB perceived a change. Only four percent believed that no one in their ODB believed there was a change

in mission focus. These numbers are excellent in that they portray, at least initially, that ODBs understand changes are being made to the manner in which SF is utilized to gain more strategic utility.

However, when asked if the knowledge of the change in focus, stated above, was turned into action, meaning a change in attitude or the manner in which the ODB conducted business, only 39 percent said a majority or the entirety of their ODBs changed their way of doing business to adapt to the new mission focus. 50 percent stated there was no, or minimal change in attitudes or the way the ODBs conducted business. This data may show that while ODBs understand that higher levels dictate a change in mission focus, they believe that they do not actually need to adapt their manner of conducting training in order to be successful at more indirect utilization. However, one may argue that the above data does not support my finding if ODBs were already conducting business in a manner that didn't require a change in attitude or procedures but still were efficient at preparing for indirect operations. However, the remainder of the analysis of supplemental questions suggests this is not the case.

Subjects were next asked what would be a primary motivator for them to fully support a change in mission focus within the subjects' respective SF Groups. 59 percent said that in depth discussions with command elements on the reasons for the shift in focus would sufficiently motivate them to provide their full support. Additionally, 20 percent stated that exciting opportunities for duty positions based on the change of mission focus would drive them to fully support and shift their mindsets. These motivational factors are key when commanders look for ways to create solidarity within the lower levels of their units.

The information from the above data analysis is crucial as the perceptions and trends should account for trends in the training section, however they do not. Discrepancies between what the respondents' perceptions of the future are and how their organizations actually act and feel toward the change in mission focus will be the subject of the following section.

(2)   ODA Leadership Perceptions Vs ODA Member Perceptions

In this subsection, subjects were asked a series of questions about their perceptions on certain topics and the perception of their ODAs. This subsection will show that disparity exists between senior and junior members of the ODAs and will describe what may be the reason for the disparity.

Subjects were asked if they believed, in their professional opinion, whether SF should conduct more direct or more indirect operations (See Figure 12). An Overwhelming 96 percent responded saying SF should conduct more indirect operations. However, when asked if the majority of the members of respondents' ODAs were given the same question, what would be the response? In that case, 61 percent of subjects said they believed the majority of their ODAs would say SF should conduct more direct operations. This disparity shows a disagreement or lack of common understanding amongst officers, NCOs, and junior enlisted members of the ODA on how SF should be best used to achieve strategic utility for the nation. If nothing else, it shows that senior ODA members and junior ODA members are not in agreement on this point, which should be a widely and strongly held assumption in a strong organizational culture.

Figure 12.   Future Mission and Direction: Should SF Conduct More Direct or Indirect Operations?

The next two questions were designed to discover any difference in perception about which SF missions would provide the most personal fulfillment for SF soldiers. Subjects were given a choice of six missions and asked which one would provide them

the most fulfillment. The highest response was 46 percent saying a FID mission with actual combat advisory roles would give them the most personal fulfillment. 20 percent said Advanced Special Operations would be most fulfilling. Only 28 percent total said either SF leading a partner force in Direct Action operations (15 percent) or conducting unilateral DA operations (13 percent) would be most personally fulfilling.

These data are significant when compared to the subjects' beliefs about what the other members of their former ODAs would say to the same question. Direct Action operations in total received an 85 percent response; 59 percent for unilateral and 26 percent for leading a partner force. Only 15 percent of those surveyed believed their ODA members would chose a FID mission as the most fulfilling. This disparity among what would be considered satisfying by the senior and junior ODA members shows many within the Regiment are motivated by highly different things. This analysis highlights the findings from the Goals and Objectives index of the Mission trait in the DOCS analysis.

As mentioned to above, SF Group leadership has publicly stated the goals of the organization however there is not widespread agreement on those goals amongst the rank and file. The reason for that disparity is shown in the above subsection. SF soldiers are motivated to conduct more direct operations and SF Groups are preparing for more indirect operations. When motivation is high to do something that does not achieve the stated goals of the organization the organizational culture likely hinders the unit's performance.

(3)   Motivations and De Oppresso Liber

The data from the next set of questions may lead to an understanding of why this disparity exists (See Figure 13). Subjects were asked to choose an approximate percentage of their former ODA teammates who joined SF because those new recruits primarily wanted to conduct Direct Action operations. As shown in Figure 13, 87 percent said half or more of their ODAs joined SF because they believed SF would conduct primarily Direct Action operations.

What percentage of your former ODA teammates were motivated to join SF because they primarily wanted to conduct DA operations and they believed SF would conduct DA a majority of the time?

- 0% of ODA: 0 Respondents
- 25% of ODA: 7 Respondents
- 50% of ODA: 14 Respondents
- 75% of ODA: 28 Respondents
- 100% of ODA: 5 Respondents

Figure 13.   Future Mission and Direction: Percentage of ODA Motivated to Join SF to Conduct DA Operations?

To determine how strong the belief and motivation to conduct DA operations was to those on the ODAs, the survey next asked what percentage of the subjects' ODAs left the Regiment/Army because they were not conducting enough DA operations to suit their desires. The majority, 46 percent said not a single member of their ODA left the Regiment/Army because they were not conducting enough DA to suit their desires. Thirty-three percent said only a quarter of their ODA left for this reason, however.

One conclusion that may be drawn from these responses is that SF soldiers are adaptable and can change their opinions and primary motivations. This is excellent news regarding the ability of the Regiment to change its organizational culture. Those that wanted to join SF primarily to conduct DA have not gotten out but have stayed in even though their primary motivation was not intrinsically rewarded. This means those soldiers are willing to change their opinions, assumptions, and motivations.

While the above data is simply respondents' opinions of other SF soldiers' beliefs and it may be argued that the data might be biased. However, the nature of interpersonal relationships amongst members of the ODAs is such that strong bonds of friendship are formed along with a daily closeness that allows ODA members to have intimate knowledge of one another. Since current ODA members could not be surveyed for this

research, data collected on subjects' perceptions of their former teammates' beliefs are crucial to understanding the organizational culture, albeit the data may not be 100 percent accurate.

The last two questions of this subsection measure the degree to which subjects believed their past and future operations lived up the values suggested in the Special Forces Motto: "De Oppresso Liber." When asked if the operations they have conducted while in SF were typified by the motto, 67 percent said either "no, not really though sometimes" or "never." Only 33 percent said "mostly" or "always." These percentages show that whatever SF has done operationally over the previous few years is not being perceived by its soldiers as adhering to the higher calling SF was designed to conduct. Though the truth of the matter is much more likely to be the opposite, the perception still exists amongst the ranks; SF is not living up to its motto.

The perception of the future does not look any different. When asked if they believed their future operations over the next decade would typify the motto, the majority, 72 percent said "no, not really, though sometimes" with only 35 percent saying, "mostly."

The espoused value that SF exists to liberate those that are oppressed is an important one. It was the very nature of the Regiment's founding. Though the SF Regiment does not choose which missions it conducts, it does chose how it relates to subordinates why the mission is being conducted and how subordinate units' roles play a significant part. The data from the above two questions clearly shows that a negative perception exists. This fact may relate strongly to the Mission trait of the DOCS. The trends show that ODAs do not understand clearly the strategy of their higher headquarters and do not understand how their ODAs play a significant role in achieving their SF Groups' goals and objectives. The SF Regiment can indeed change this perception and must do so if it is to build a healthy organizational culture founded on values.

b.   *Training*

This section considers the norms and beliefs of how training time is utilized. It tests the level of agreement on the emphasis that is given to training on various tasks that may be build necessary skills which will be crucial for future mission success during indirect operations.

(1)   Use of Training Time. This subsection contains questions that gather data on the amount of time spent conducting various training tasks, subjects' level of satisfaction with the time spent, and reasons more time is not placed on the various tasks. The goal of this subsection is to determine the emphasis placed on various training tasks in order to understand where the training focus lies; in relation to the skills most useful in indirect operations and those more applicable to direct action operations.

As Figure 14 shows, in general, weapons proficiency, small unit tactics and close quarters battle (CQB) were each trained for greater lengths of time (measured in weeks per quarter) than language training. Additionally, cultural awareness training was conducted less than two hours a week. The discussion below provides interesting insight into the priorities of training tasks and reasons why language proficiency and cultural awareness training were given the least emphasis.

Figure 14.   Time Devoted to Training Tasks

The slight majority of respondents, 44 percent, stated they spent between 4 to 8 weeks per quarter conducting weapons training. A strong minority of 43 percent said they conducted this training from one to three weeks per quarter. The majority, 70 percent, believed the above training time was adequate. However, 22 percent believed more time must be spent on weapons training. The reasons why more time was not spent conducting weapons training were mixed. The majority, only 26 percent, said they believed they were at an acceptable level of proficiency on this skill, while 24 percent believed admin duties stood in the way of further weapons training. However, 24 percent chose to write in responses. Of note from the write in responses was the majority said other required training took priority and prevented them from doing more weapons training.

When asked the amount of time devoted to CQB, 59 percent of respondents said their ODAs spent one to three weeks per quarter on this skill. However, 24 percent said they spent either four to eight weeks or over eight weeks per quarter on CQB. The majority, 80 percent believed the time they spent on training CQB was adequate and 48 percent believed they were at an acceptable level of proficiency in this skill. This data shows the high amount of time devoted to training CQB as well as the fact that many

respondents said the amount of time was adequate to produce the desired level of proficiency. This widely shared belief shows that in SF's organizational culture CQB is believed to be of high importance to which long periods of training time must be devoted.

Small unit tactics (SUT) were trained by the majority (56 percent) of respondents for one to three weeks per quarter with nearly a quarter (24 percent) of respondents saying they spent less than one week on the task. A very small minority (13 percent), however, said their ODAs spent between four to eight weeks on SUT. The slight majority of respondents (56 percent) believed they did not spend enough time training SUT, however a strong minority, 44 percent, believed the amount of time spent on this task was sufficient. Only 26 percent of those surveyed believed they were proficient in this task and required no more time increasing their level of proficiency. While 24 percent said administrative duties prevented them from training more on SUT, 37 percent said other training tasks took priority.

In stark contrast to the above three training tasks, language proficiency training, received much less attention. According to a total of 67 percent of respondents less than one week per quarter (48 percent) or no weeks per quarter (19 percent) were spent increasing language capability. Only 31 percent said their ODAs spent from one to three weeks increasing their language proficiency per quarter. The vast majority of those surveyed (81 percent), however, were not satisfied with the minimal amount of time devoted to this skill. While 66 percent said other training or administrative requirements prevented them from spending more time on language proficiency, several respondents chose to write in reasons they were unable to spend more time reaching fluency in their assigned languages. Of note from the written responses were multiple references to a lack of command or ODA emphasis for this training, a lack of training resources, or the fact that their assigned language was not spoken in the country to which they were primarily deployed to. An example of this was Spanish speaking, 7th SF Group officers and French speaking 3rd SF Group officers who were constantly deployed to Afghanistan where Spanish and French were not spoken.

The last set of questions in this subsection concern the amount of emphasis placed on enhancing cultural awareness at the ODA level. Respondents overwhelming showed

little attention was paid to this skill with 78 percent saying their ODAs spent less than two hours per week to increase their cultural knowledge. Though 63 percent admitted they needed to spend more time on this training task, the remainder believed they were satisfied with the minor amount of time spent. As above, priority given to other training or administrative tasks were the most highly chosen reason more time was not devoted to increasing the level of cultural awareness.

(2)   Motivation and "Soft" Skills. The above data shows that of the available training time in a quarter, increasing the non-lethal skills such as cultural awareness and language proficiency of ODAs was not given priority. Though most respondents said they believed their ODAs needed more training on language proficiency, the following set of data suggests motivation to increase language capability is, however, very low.

Subjects were asked how much personal time they devoted to increasing their language capability. Since team training time was limited, it can be concluded that if language capability was truly important to the subjects they may have used their personal time to increase their capability. However, 63 percent of respondents said they spent less than two hours per week studying language on their own. Only 28 percent said they spent between two and four hours per week and nine percent said they spent over four hours per week. Overwhelmingly the reason given for not spending personal time to enhance their language capability was that the respondents felt personal time was to be spent with their families or other "off-time" activities. While this is absolutely understandable given the high OPTEMPO that SF soldiers live daily, this data says something about the organizational culture of SF that needs to change. Simply, language is important, but not important enough to divert personal time. Therefore, dedicated training time needs to be devoted to this skill.

The belief is widely held that language is, indeed, important and requires more training time, however ODAs are either unwilling or unable to spend less time on the more lethal skills (weapons proficiency, CQB or SUT) to devote more time to language proficiency. The disparity between the importance of language proficiency, as evidenced by those that feel they need to train more time on it, and the amount of training time devoted to language capability enhancement shows that the espoused value SF has of having excellent language capability may not be widely shared amongst its soldiers. If it

were, the data would suggest that the time spent on increasing language capability would be satisfactory to the respondents, the majority would believe they were at an acceptable level of language proficiency and the personal time devoted to language training would remain low because the respondents would have conducted this training to a high degree during the workweek.

The overall data analyzed in this subsection show that weapons training, followed by CQB received the greatest amount of emphasis and attention. While undoubtedly given any environment and any mission, the ability to shoot, move and communicate are vital to survival and therefore must be trained to a high degree of proficiency. However, as data shows, other tasks, both training and administrative take up precious time. When time is short, the organizational culture of SF has promoted the priority of training time should be spent on the "lethal" skills over the "soft" skills. However, it may be argued that these skills, though important in which to be proficient, are less necessary than small unit tactics, language proficiency and cultural understanding if indeed more indirect operations such as FID and UW are to be the focus of SF for the future.

(3)   What's Important to Whom. The next subsection asks subjects what training tasks were most important, why they were important, and tests the level that senior commanders perceive the same importance for the given training tasks.

When given nine training tasks and asked which one the respondents' ODA needed to focus on the most, the response was quite varied (see Figure 15). While language proficiency did receive the majority of direct response, it was only 17 percent. The "Other" responses varied, however the majority said a combination of the listed tasks were necessary. The following figure depicts the rates of responses:

Figure 15.   Training: The Training Area Respondents Believed Needed the Most Emphasis for Success in Future Missions

When asked why they selected the particular task, only four percent believed it was because their ODAs were deficient in that task compared to the others. The majority of respondents (46 percent) chose the task they did because they believed it would be used most in the upcoming decade of SF utilization. The second most prevalent reason chosen (24 percent) was because they believed the task would be most useful in an upcoming deployment.

To understand the relationship between what ODAs perceive as the most important task required to be successful in the future and what the perception of BN/Group commanders, subjects were asked to select, from the same set of tasks, which one carried the most weight with their commanders. Again, the results vary, however CQB received 26 percent and language proficiency received 24 percent. Of the 33 percent who chose write in answers, there a high amount of variance but some said there

was no discernable focus, many others suggested their commanders were focused on Pre-Mission Training events or other events that emphasized multi-task training such as UW culmination exercises.

While the responses given by those surveyed showed variance in the tasks they thought were most necessary for success and what they believed to be important to their commander there is a more important point from this subsection to be highlighted. Since the most important task for the respondents' ODAs varied, but the reason most of them chose the certain task was because they thought it would be used most in the coming decade, this shows a possible lack of common understanding about what how SF will operate in the future and what tasks will be of primary importance in order to be successful. This suggests that the organization has not built a common culture that perceives the same future for the Regiment. This point supports the findings of the DOCS analysis in the Mission trait.

(4)   Training Guidance. One may hypothesize that the discrepancy pointed out in the previous sub-section between what the respondents believed to be most important for their ODA and what they believed was most emphasized from their higher headquarters might be an issue with leadership or training guidance. However this subsection reveals that is not the case. Subjects were asked how often they followed their commanders' training guidance and how often that guidance was enforced. The results show that 87 percent said they followed their commander's guidance over 50 percent of the time. What's more, 65 percent responded that their commanders' guidance was enforced most of the time or always.

Since commanders' guidance was followed and enforced, yet the previous subsection was unclear on exactly what was most important to train on for future success, it may be concluded that there is great discrepancy among the SF ranks as to exactly what the future holds. This confusion proves again the findings of the DOCS in the Mission trait.

(5)   Training Tasks and Deployment Scenarios. The following subsection provides subjects with a series of scenarios about deployments they may undergo and asks them, given one week of training prior to the various types of deployments, what

one training task would a majority of their ODAs liked to have seen conducted? These questions were asked to determine the respondents' perceptions about whether the majority of their teammates would choose to do the same type of training regardless of whether the mission would call for it. The results are depicted in Figure 16.

The scenarios given were a FID deployment, a combat deployment to Afghanistan, a UW mission, and a CNT mission. In all cases minus the UW mission, the highest number of respondents said the majority of their ODAs would want to train on CQB and SUT the most.

Figure 16.   Training Tasks Chosen for Four Deployment Scenarios

The data, as shown in Figure 16, beg the question, do SF soldiers believe that what has always been trained on for prior missions will be what needs to be trained on to prepare for all missions? It can be suggested that indeed, this is the case. The organizational culture seems to allow SF ODAs to fall back on the same training regardless of the mission.

(6)   Relationships and the Global SOF Network. The last subsection of questions shows the perception subjects have about the importance of long-term relationships with indigenous persons with whom they have contact during deployments. The testing of this perception is crucial to understanding the degree ODAs comprehend, accept and support the Global SOF Network and the likelihood that a commonly shared belief in the importance of the Global SOF Network will be widely shared in the Regiment. If it is not, SF's contribution to the Global SOF Network may not be as robust as it could be.

Responses in this subsection were mixed. While a majority of respondents (39 percent) said they would devote one hour per month to stay in contact with indigenous persons whom they meet on deployments, a close second was those respondents who said they would only spend one hour per quarter staying on contact (33 percent). What the data does show, however is that the vast majority of respondents think this task is important enough to devote some time to as only 22 percent said they would only spend one hour per year on this task.

The overwhelming majority of respondents (63 percent) were in agreement that the potential for future travel to visit their indigenous contacts would motivate them to spend more time and effort to maintaining contact. One of the most important facts about this particular question, however is that 17 percent of those surveyed wrote in a response when no open-ended, write-in answer was a choice. Those 17 percent said that they would gladly stay in contact with those they meet on deployments if the respondents' security clearances would not be jeopardized by constant contact with foreigners.

The analysis of this subsection shows that indeed there is widely shared value in gaining and maintaining contact with foreigners and SF soldiers would most likely see

not only utility in doing so, but would be easily motivated by continued deployments to strengthen these contacts. This boasts well for the future of the Global SOF Network and SF's contributions to the advancement of it.

c.   *Rewards and Desires*

This section identifies some aspects of training and deployments that are desirable to respondents and identifies reward systems that need to be altered to support the building of skills that will be required of SF during the execution of indirect operations. The questions and data analysis are important to understand some motivational factors that, if wielded properly, could assist in the building of organizational cultural traits that will enhance SF's capability to succeed in future indirect operations. These questions are not an inclusive list training tasks or of motivators. However they are an important few that are critical for commanders to understand in order to begin changing the organizational culture to support more indirect operations.

(1)   Deployment and Motivation. The first subsection asks how long the subjects would like to be deployed to train with foreign partners, then asks if those deployments would motivate them to increase their language

Figure 17 shows that the majority of responses, 81 percent, showed that they would like to deploy between four to six months per year to conduct training with foreign counterparts within their assigned AOR. More importantly, 96 percent of subjects said deploying for this amount of time for this reason would provide motivation for them to increase their language proficiency and cultural understanding.

Number of months/year you would like to deploy to a foreign country to train partner forces?

Figure 17.   Rewards and Desires: Number of Months/Yr Subjects Would Like to Deploy to Train Foreign Partners

This correlation seems to be fairly straightforward; however, most SF ODAs deploy for this length of time currently. What then is important to note are the responses to open-ended questions from previous sections. For previous questions pertaining to language training, many write-in answers suggested ODAs were not deploying to the countries or regions in which their assigned language is spoken, however, doing so would greatly motivate them to increase their capability in their assigned language.

(2)   Likelihood of Reward for Desirable Behavior. The next subsection ask subjects how likely they are to be rewarded by both the chain of command and fellow teammates for excelling at language proficiency. The last question in this subsection asks what type of reward from the Chain of Command would best motivate the subjects to increase their language capability.

While a small minority of subjects responded that they were likely to receive reward from their Chain of Command the majority said they were not likely to be rewarded. Additionally, subjects responded that they were equally not likely to receive praise or reward from fellow teammates.

This fact is crucial to understanding why motivation is low to attain better language capability at the ODA level. This skill has been identified in previous chapters as being absolutely necessary to not only conducting more successful indirect operations but also in building long-lasting partnerships. The survey shows, however, that there exists a norm that minimal rewards are handed out for this key skill. One may also

suggest from this point that minimal emphasis has been given as well. This "shared norm" presents a downside of the current organizational culture within Special Forces.

The final question in this subsection which asks what reward would be sufficient to motivate the subjects to increase their language capability. The majority of responses (52 percent) indicate that selection for the best deployments being based on language proficiency would motivate them the most to increase their capability. Selection for future duty assignments based on language proficiency received the second highest number of responses at 31 percent. These bold numbers suggest that the specific rewards that would motivate soldiers to increase their language capability are fairly straightforward and would not be hard for SF Groups to implement.

Informal discussions with a former SF Group Commander suggest that some SF Groups are beginning to adopt language proficiency as a determining factor for selection of ODAs for the most coveted missions. However this selection criteria needs to be the norm in order to act as a strong motivator to alter the current organizational culture.

(3)   By, With, Through. The final subsection of the survey showed a positive aspect of SF's organizational culture. A key aspect of organizational culture is how people feel about the jobs they do. A key component of SF soldiers' jobs is their ability and desire to work by, with, and through indigenous personnel to successfully reach mission accomplishment. The final four questions ask how much enjoyment is received by working with the indigenous forces of their assigned AOR, being immersed in the cultures of their assigned AOR, learning about cultural differences from those in their AOR and the American culture, and the possibility of staying in touch with indigenous persons they have contact during deployments. In all four cases, the overwhelming majority of responses on the scale of 1–5 were either 4: "A good amount of enjoyment" or 5: "Great Enjoyment." For each question, these two responses gathered over 80 percent of the responses. This analysis shows that SF soldiers continue to be motivated, despite several of the other findings of this study, to be amongst the foreign cultures of their AOR and find great pleasure in working by, with, and through their counterparts. This shared norm may be the basis that upon which, the Special Forces Regiment may begin to repair the aspects of its organizational culture that are currently a hindrance.

E. FINAL THOUGHTS ON EMPIRICS

Overall, the data analyzed suggests that while changes to the Regiment's vision, goals, and objectives are acknowledged, those changes, and their intended ramifications on preparations for the future, are not fully understood at lower levels. More importantly, no simultaneous behavioral changes appear to be taking place at the ODA level to facilitate the achievement of the new goals and objectives. The organizational culture identified in this research is likely the cause for the lack of changed behaviors. It leans heavily toward a DA-focus and lacks adaptability. Therefore, it is likely that the current organizational culture of the SFGs will prevent them from attaining the highest levels of performance in future operations. The following chapter will provide recommendations for improving the organizational culture to help ensure this does not happen.

IV. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

A. INTRODUCTION

This research suggests that many aspects of the organizational culture of the Special Forces Regiment may require change, as the overarching culture may be adversely affecting SF's ability to be effective in achieving its goals. Chief among the issues at the SFG level of analysis is a lack of SF soldiers' understanding of the SFGs' vision, goals, and strategies of employing the forces to accomplish the objectives. Additionally, there is a lack of understanding of the role SF plays in the larger DOD and Interagency approach to a whole of government solution to increasing national security. The organizational culture at the ODA level of analysis is also hindering the building of skills that will prove vital for mission accomplishment in the future operating environment. While a shift in mission focus is acknowledged by the ODAs, the beliefs, norms, and collective actions necessary to refocus training to meet the new objectives is not being altered. This chapter will summarize the findings of the data analyzed in Chapter III and will provide recommendations for action to correct the deficiencies in SF's organizational culture as well as recommendations for further research.

B. SUMMARY OF EMPIRICAL RESULTS

A summary of the results from the data analysis follow. Results will be presented in two sections; first by each DOCS trait from the most troublesome aspect (Mission) to the most beneficial (Involvement), then by the three sections from the supplemental questionnaire, Future Mission and Direction, Training and Rewards and Desires. What follows will allow the reader to understand the most pressing issues discovered in this study and pave the way for a discussion of recommendations.

1. Denison Organizational Culture Survey Results

a. Mission

The results from the DOCS represent the condition of the organizational culture of the SF Regiment. Overall those in the Regiment do not have a clear understanding of

the organization's vision and strategies to reach its goals. This is an interesting finding because the vision and strategy is clearly outlined by USASOC. Regardless of the uncertainty with which SF operates, there still should be widespread understanding of the basic, overarching mission, purpose, and commander's intent down to the lowest subordinate. This lack of understanding is possibly the biggest issue found regarding the Regiment's organizational culture as these key pieces of information drive everything the unit does. Due to a lack of clear understanding of the vision, goals, and strategies of the SFGs there also exists no clear linkage between the daily activities the ODAs conduct (planning, training, and execution) and the SFG's goals. As soldiers do not understand where their activities fit in the larger mission and purpose of their respective SFGs the ODAs cannot adequately nest their training programs to support the higher headquarters objectives.

b. Adaptability

Surprisingly, SF's culture is not as adaptable as it may well need to be. Additionally, those in the Regiment may not understand what the larger U.S. Army and Interagency requirements are or what their relationships to SF are. This aspect of SF's culture must improve if SF is to cooperate more effectively with interagency partners or integrate fully with U.S. Army conventional forces to foster greater achievement of national security goals. Since these are objectives of USASOC, this trend corresponds to the above discussion on a lack of understanding of higher headquarters' vision, goals, and strategies. What appears to diminish SF's adaptability is the inability of the SF Groups to share information and work across different parts of the organization. Without effective sharing of information and communication of lessons learned, the SFGs and the ODAs within them, will not be as effective during employment as they would be had they learned the lessons of their sister units. SF soldiers also find it hard to coordinate and work across parts of the SFG. Overall, SF has room for improvement in the way it understands and deals with its external environment and how it handles cross-Group interactions and knowledge sharing.

c. *Consistency*

A more positive aspect of SF's organizational culture is that members of the organization feel there is strong set of values in place that foster agreement on how to operate. SF soldiers also have great faith and respect for their leadership. This bodes well for any organizational change initiatives instituted by leaders because data shows if the leaders make the changes and communicate the reasons why to the men, those changes will be widely accepted.

d. *Involvement*

The strongest trait of the SF organizational culture is the shared feeling that the Regiment has selected, trained, and equipped the best men for the job and has provided enough autonomy to the ODAs to accomplish the tasks they are given. This is the bedrock of SF's organizational culture. This strong trait is a sense of pride for SF soldiers and must be retained during the implementation of any cultural change programs. Many of the recommendations that follow will lean on this strength to ensure overall culture change is implemented and accepted.

2. Supplemental Questionnaire Results

Overall analysis from the supplemental questionnaire shows that SF soldiers are more motivated to train on the lethal skill sets over the non-lethal skills that will be required to a great degree in the future employment of SF. These additional questions are presented in the concluding section as they serve to illuminate paths for future research. The following summation will be broken down by the three sections of the supplemental questionnaire.

a. *Future Mission and Direction*

SF soldiers understand the need for a shift in mission focus from direct application of forces to a more indirect role. However, this change is not being translated into action. This may be a case of confusion about what the future holds and how the training at the ODA will lead to increased effectiveness during future operations. This would follow the lack of understanding about the vision, goals and objectives described

above. However, it is also likely that the organizational culture, as we will see below, is one that does not foster change in the patterns of preparation – namely, planning and training.

b. *Training*

Overall, training time is spent on the skill sets most desired by the ODA: marksmanship and CQB. Language and cultural awareness are trained much less though the importance of these skills is widely agreed upon. Additionally, there is no consensus found by this research in perceptions about what skills will be most useful in the future. As discussed above, this is most likely due to a lack of understanding about the vision for the future within the SFGs. The trends show that SF soldiers tend to fall back on whatever training they feel comfortable doing or whatever they have done for previous deployments regardless of if new deployments will be similar at all to the prior ones. This aspect of the organizational culture at the ODA level has obvious negative impacts on readiness. The absence of knowledge about the future means ODAs will simply achieve the status quo. Undoubtedly each training event will be different; different venue or ranges, different manners for incorporating several tasks into one event, etc. However essentially, the ODAs will continue to train on the lethal skills over the non-lethal skills unless the organizational culture is adapted.

c. *Rewards and Desires*

SF soldiers are highly motivated to deploy to the countries within their AOR, remain for relatively long periods of time, and work by, with, and through their foreign partners. As the Involvement trait was the strongest and most positive aspect of the entire SF Organizational culture, so too is this trend the most positive aspect of culture at the ODA level. It is the bedrock on which SF is successful. This presents a bright spot for the future of SF. This widely shared norm will increase the likelihood of success of the Global SOF Network, and it will increase the effects of partnership with foreign units to increase America's National Security.

What is discouraging however is the lack of perception that reward, in any fashion, is not likely to be given for soldiers who excel at the very skills the Regiment

needs to develop the most (Clemmer, 2009). Without reward incentives, motivation to increase capability in non-lethal skills will never be as high as if a system (informal or formal) for reward was in place and visible to members of the SFGs.

C.   RECOMMENDATIONS

Cultures are based on shared experiences and histories. To change an organization's culture takes time, however change is possible. As circumstances change, people and the cultures of which they are a part, are forced to change. The circumstances under which all SFGs operate are changing. The members of those SFGs will change their behaviors and, after time, the behaviors will become commonplace and the underlying assumptions that will emerge will drive the actions and feelings of the SF soldiers. This will create a new organizational culture to help the Regiment adapt internally in order to deal with its external environment. In order to facilitate and accelerate this process, the following recommendations are made: an overarching strategy for change, recommendations for changing the overarching culture, and recommendations to change specific aspects of culture that prevent attaining the skills necessary for success.

1.   Overarching Strategy for Change

The overarching strategy for long-term organizational culture change is based loosely on Schein's dynamics of change concept (Schein, 1997). To ensure long-lasting organizational change, SFG leadership must adhere to the following three steps. This is an overarching concept to apply to any cultural change independent of the specific recommendations that follow.

First, the leadership must create a motivation for members to change. To do those in the Regiment must be shown that their current behavior is not supportive of the goals of the organization. The Regiment then must be shown that its behavior is having (or will have) negative impacts on SF's ability to be successful. Lastly the Regiment must be shown that there exists that ability to correct itself and align its behavior with the goals in order to achieve success.

Second, SFG leadership must institute the mechanisms for change that apply to their particular SFG. Some recommendations for change follow based on trends for all the SFGs together, however commanders must research the pitfalls specific to their organization's culture and create a plan of action for addressing change to better ensure acceptability amongst the members of their SFG. Additionally, the SFGs must track their cultural change progress with the same scrutiny they would any other important program.

Last SFGs need to reinforce and solidify the changed behaviors. To do this the SFG must show its soldiers that their new behaviors are having a positive effect on the unit's performance. Rewards and recognition will play a key role in this final step as will clear and widespread communication.

As stated previously, the above is an overarching concept for organizational culture change. Again, it is important to highlight that this concept is necessary to adhere to in order to ensure long-term success of cultural change initiatives. Specific recommendations for change based on the findings of this research follow. Those recommendations will be presented in two parts; recommendations for overall culture change for the SFGs and recommendations for change to ODA-specific aspects of the identified organizational culture.

2.   Recommendations to Address SF's Culture at the Group Level

The following recommendations are given in their order to priority of importance. In summary, the most important suggestions are clear communication, ensuring long-term change, and coach and mentor subordinates.

a.   *Communicate Effectively*

The most important recommendation based on the findings of this research is that the vision, goals and objectives of USASOC and the SFGs needs to clearly be communicated to the members of the Regiment. Communicating is not enough, however, SF's leadership must ensure that the lowest levels understand how their day-to-day behaviors and actions contribute to the overall accomplishment of these goals and objectives. Each member of an ODA must understand how his short term goals, such as a

successful FID mission, help achieve the long term goals of the Regiment at large. Clearly explaining this link and the link to SF's political, strategic, operational, and tactical performance will ensure motivation is high for ODAs to prepare in order to be successful as possible. SF is currently beginning to ensure that each of its ODAs' deployments is nested into a higher SOF or COCOM's objectives. This information must be impressed upon the ODAs and it is the responsibility of leaders in the SFG to ensure the ODAs clearly understand it prior to preparing for the mission.

b. *Encourage Long-Term Cultural Change*

To ensure long-term progress of organizational culture change, it is imperative the SFG leadership have continuity amongst subsequent command teams. Leaders rotate frequently and many of the strides made to change the culture may not come to fruition if incoming leaders do not continue the programs of change. To address this issue, commanders need to make organizational change programs formal and highlight these programs in continuity briefs to their replacements.

SF's organizational culture has many positive traits that must be leaned on to help change the negative aspects of the culture. While areas such as refocusing training efforts on language expertise and cultural awareness need more emphasis from leaders, other strong aspects of the culture must not lose strength. For example, micromanaging training schedules may achieve the desired behavior regarding training priorities, however this would decrease the strength SF's culture has in the autonomy of its ODAs and their ability to operate on their own. That autonomy is central to success for the organization as a whole. Instead, leaders must develop methods of providing emphasis on behaviors they want to see changed, allow ODAs the opportunity to change and monitor their progress adding course corrections where necessary. To further highlight this point, discussion will follow on recommendations for mentoring and providing greater personal interaction between commanders and junior leaders.

Long-term change of the culture is also dependent on continued selection and indoctrination of SF recruits. In the beginning is the best time and place to teach the soldiers how to act and what is important for success. The Special Forces Selection and

Assessment Course (SFAS) continually adapts to test and select recruits who possess those attributes most desired by the Regiment. It must continue to do so. Also, the recruitment process needs to expose potential recruits to what SF really is and what missions it will conduct in the future. As the empirical data showed, many of the current members of the Regiment joined because they thought SF would do direct action operations a majority of the time. While this may have been the case in the past, it will not be in the future. SF must communicate to its recruiting pool the realities of future SF operations then recruit and select those that are the best fit for the future goals of the organization.

c.   Mentor, Educate, and Cast a Wide Net

In order to educate and more effectively communicate goals and guidance SFG Commanders must provide more personalized leadership and mentoring to their subordinates, specifically ODA commanders. SFGs should regularly gather all available officers together for discussion groups with the SFG Commander in order for him to have a venue to clearly communicate his vision, goals and objectives as well as address any questions from the ODAs to clear up any misunderstandings. This process relates to the recommendation for effective communication above. This information is too important to the building of a strong organizational culture to be simply passed down the chain of command. As any who have served as commanders at any level will know, things get lost in translation from a commander to subordinates and this has a trickle-down effect. Additionally, SF Battalion (BN) Commanders must continue to counsel and mentor their ODA commanders. However the focus of these sessions should concern the performance of the ODA in its progress of changing behaviors to fit the desired organizational culture. Strong BN leadership will know the strengths and weaknesses of the ODAs and will be able to monitor their progress and be able to provide feedback to ODA leaders during this process to ensure progress is made.

ODAs don't know what they don't know. Education is key to the process of organizational culture change. As described above in the overarching strategy for change, ODAs must be told what they are doing wrong and the negative impact that behavior has

on the objectives of the SFG. However, this is only the first step. Leadership must educate junior members of the organization on "what right looks like." More importantly though, is leadership teaching ODAs why they must adopt new behaviors. While this may be easy for many in the Regiment to intuitively figure out, ensuring clear and unified understanding through teaching will foster the building of underlying assumptions of how to operate and why operating that way is important. These assumptions will lead to a stronger organizational culture that will provide a more positive impact on the unit's performance.

SFG and BN leadership must also manage its talent across their units in order to put the right soldiers in the right positions to foster cultural change. The most effective NCOs and officers will be the ones who have adopted the desired behaviors and foster the desired organizational culture amongst those within their span of control. These soldiers can be moved to other parts of the organization where behavior needs refocusing and organizational culture is not supporting the unit's goals. Empowering these specified leaders to change the culture of their new subordinate units will provide a wider change throughout the organization.

3. Recommendations Specific to ODAs Building Necessary Skillsets

a. *Operational Detachment Bravo (ODB) Responsibilities*

The ODBs will have great responsibility in changing the organizational culture at the ODA level. Their efforts will be critical in changing perceptions, assumptions, and behaviors to ensure ODAs acquire the skills necessary for success in future indirect operations. Firstly, ODBs are responsible for providing guidance, direction, emphasis, and resources for training. As ODBs require training plans and schedules from ODAs they must manage the desires of the ODA-shown to be focused on lethal skills-with the requirements for mission preparation-non-lethal skills. As the ODBs are more intimately aware of the ODAs strengths and weaknesses it is their responsibility to act as a forcing mechanism to change behaviors. This sort of approach will only work to change behavior in the short term It will not have lasting effect on the role organizational culture plays in determining behavior unless the ODBs educate their subordinates on what the acceptable

behaviors are and reinforce this learning regularly. To do this, ODBs need to ensure their ODAs understand why non-lethal skills are just as, if not more, important to train as lethal skills in order for the ODAs to help the SFG reach its goals. Also, as most ODB Commanders are recent ILE graduates, they will have a greater understanding of the operational and strategic role SF operations play in achieving national security objectives. They must impart this wisdom on their subordinate leaders in order to show them how their day-to-day activities link to higher level end states. By teaching their subordinates, the ODAs will more fully understand their roles and be more willing to change their behaviors to align themselves more fully with the SFG's needs.

b.   Collective Training

ODA collective training must focus on the various skills necessary to succeed in indirect operations. This will benefit the ODAs twofold. First, if the ODB or BN Commanders plan the training events far enough in advance, focus those events on the non-lethal skills, communicate the focus of the event, and give adequate time for the ODAs to prepare then the collective training (and the associated pre-event, ODA training) will act as a forcing function to ensure ODAs are training the non-lethal skills. As stated above however, forcing functions cannot work to change the culture on their own. However if collective training events are frequent in number and focus on the non-lethal skills, over time the importance of the non-lethal skills will be emphasized and accepted by the ODAs. Secondly, the ODB or BN can evaluate the performance of the ODAs in acquiring the non-lethal skills and provide mentoring, rewards, and punishments to promote the desired behavior which will further the changes to the organizational culture.

The SFGs have already begun placing more emphasis on UW-focused collective training because it trains and evaluates all the skills an ODA will need for UW deployments as well as those needed for FID deployments. As stated previously, FID deployments are the most likely and USASOC has stated that UW capabilities need to be increased. However, if these UW training events incorporate role players speaking only

the languages assigned to the ODAs undergoing the training then, as above, ODAs will be forced to increase their language capability prior to the event.

Once behavioral change has started to take place the desired behaviors must be rewarded. Positive reward systems are crucial in ensuring long term cultural change. This does not mean everyone who scores highly on their language aptitude test should receive a military medal. However it does mean that recognition of success in the areas of training that need emphasis will serve to promote the values the unit is trying to instill amongst its members. From the empirical research, the most coveted missions/deployments, selection for exciting duty positions, and opportunities for foreign cultural emersion are widely respected and sought after rewards. From informal discussions with a former SFG Commander, many of the SFGs are already instituting a form of reward where language aptitude is a deciding factor in determining which ODAs are assigned choice missions. Additionally, negative reinforcement is used when ODAs are not fully mission capable due to a lack of language capability. Both of these are excellent places to start. As for assignments based on language proficiency, it is important to note that this reward will only achieve the outcome of greater language aptitude if the requirement for language proficiency is communicated early to those who may desire such a position. Voicing this requirement early will provide great motivation for those who seek the desired position.

Public praise is a method of reward that not only rewards the individual, but communicates to a wider audience the behaviors the SFG wants to promote and gives some incentive to do so. This reward does not need to be given out during full dress formations or other large gatherings. SF soldiers by their nature do not desire this kind of public praise and doing so may have the opposite effect. However a commander simply coming into a team room unannounced to tell an ODA member job well done in front of his ODA would be public rewards enough.

4.   Recommendations for Further Research

As stated previously this study is based only on a cluster sample and although interpretations about the entire Regiment were deducted from the data, a more

representative study needs to be conducted concerning both the condition of SF's overall organizational culture and of its effects on readiness for future operations. In conducting this research, it is imperative that the study gathers data from each SFG and from all ranks therein. Additionally, data from this study must be analyzed in depth, broken down by the subject's rank, BN, and time in SF. These data sets may show differing trends and provide a more accurate picture of the SF organizational culture, its subcultures, and be able to provide more nuanced recommendations for change.

Additionally, further research must be conducted on the best practices for reward and punishment systems meant to foster desired behaviors from ODAs. The implementation of findings from such a study would significantly help SFGs alter their organizational culture. Also research in this vein would provide commanders with a greater understanding of the tools at their disposal to better motivate their men and encourage change for the better.

Research into marketing campaigns may provide insight into how SF can better promote their special warfare brand, not only to new recruits but also to political, CF and interagency leaders as well. Instituting the lessons learned from such research would ensure recruits are knowledgeable about special warfare, are accepting of those missions as the primary missions of SF, and ensure they are motivated to conduct those activities long before they join the ranks. Increasing awareness of SW, its purpose and effects, to politicians can serve to garner political support that may make SF, conducting SW, to be the first course of action thought of when security challenges arise. Increasing the knowledge of the role SF plays in SW and increasing the belief in its merits amongst both CF and interagency will serve to foster greater supporting relationships during the conduct of these operations; which will ultimately lead to greater effect achieved towards the end state of the operations.

D.   FINAL THOUGHTS

Special Forces are, and will remain, a potent weapon in America's arsenal for meeting the challenge of irregular warfare. They will continue to train, fight, and win wherever ordered to go and whatever ordered to do. This fact has been proved time and

again since the inception of the unit. However, having an organizational culture that supports the mission is a vital component and a necessary condition for better performance. To summarize this research, in order to tweak the organizational culture, SF needs to do one thing: make desired norms and behaviors "sexy." SF soldiers always want the newest gear, the coolest weapons and gadgets, the best looking uniforms, etc. They want to go to the training venues that offer the most challenging ranges or will result in the best bragging rights. Soldiers use the term, "sexy" to describe these new, exciting, and coveted aspects of "SF life." Any organizational cultural change is easy if the SF Soldier perceives the desired behaviors as sexy. If that can be done, and it is no small feat, the organizational culture will sort itself out and SF will be as effective as it could ever be.

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APPENDIX A. DENISON ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE SURVEY

| Trait | Index | Denison Organizational Culture Survey
Read each question carefully | Answer all questions on a 1-5 scale based on how much you agree or disagree with the statement made. | | | | |
			1=Strongly Disagree	2=Disagree	3=Neutral	4=Agree	5=Strongly Agree
INVOLVEMENT	EMPOWERMENT	Most SF Soldiers are highly involved in their work.	1	2	3	4	5
		Decisions are usually made at the level where the best information is available.	1	2	3	4	5
		Information is widely shared so that everyone can get the information he or she needs when it's needed.	1	2	3	4	5
		Everyone believes that he or she can have a positive impact on the mission.	1	2	3	4	5
		Operational planning is ongoing and involves everyone in the process to some degree.	1	2	3	4	5
	TEAM ORIENTATION	Cooperation across different parts of the SF Group is actively encouraged.	1	2	3	4	5
		People work like they are part of a team.	1	2	3	4	5
		Teamwork is used to get work done, rather than hierarchy.	1	2	3	4	5
		Teams are our primary building blocks.	1	2	3	4	5
		Work is organized so that each person can see the relationship between his or her job and the goals of the SF Group.	1	2	3	4	5
	CAPABILITY DEVELOPMENT	Authority is delegated so that people can act on their own.	1	2	3	4	5
		The "bench strength" (capability of people) is constantly improving.	1	2	3	4	5
		There is continuous investment in the skills of SF members.	1	2	3	4	5
		The capabilities of people are viewed as an important source of competitive advantage.	1	2	3	4	5
		Problems often arise because we do not have the skills necessary to do the job.	1	2	3	4	5
CONSISTENCY	CORE VALUES	The leaders and managers "practice what they preach."	1	2	3	4	5
		There is a characteristic management style and a distinct set of management practices.	1	2	3	4	5
		There is a clear and consistent set of values that governs the way we do business.	1	2	3	4	5
		Ignoring core values will get you in trouble.	1	2	3	4	5
		There is an ethical code that guides our behavior and tells us right from wrong.	1	2	3	4	5
	AGREEMENT	When disagreements occur, we work hard to achieve "win-win" solutions.	1	2	3	4	5
		There is a "strong" culture of your SF Group.	1	2	3	4	5
		It is easy to reach consensus, even on difficult issues.	1	2	3	4	5
		We often have trouble reaching agreement on key issues.	1	2	3	4	5
		There is a clear agreement about the right way and the wrong way to do things.	1	2	3	4	5
	COORDINATION AND INTEGRATION	Our approach in operating is very consistent and predictable.	1	2	3	4	5
		People from different parts of the organization share a common perspective.	1	2	3	4	5
		It is easy to coordinate projects across different parts of the SF Group	1	2	3	4	5
		Working with someone from another part of this organization is like working with someone from a different organization.	1	2	3	4	5
		There is good alignment of goals across levels throughout the SF Group.	1	2	3	4	5

Trait	Index	Denison Organizational Culture Survey Read each question carefully	Answer all questions on a 1-5 scale based on how much you agree or disagree with the statement made.				
			1=Strongly Disagree	2=Disagree	3=Neutral	4=Agree	5=Strongly Agree
ADAPTABILITY	CREATING CHANGE	The way things are done is very flexible and easy to change.	1	2	3	4	5
		We respond well to outside influences and other changes in the operating environment.	1	2	3	4	5
		New and improved ways to do work are continually adopted.	1	2	3	4	5
		Attempts to create change usually meet with resistance.	1	2	3	4	5
		Different parts of the SF Group often cooperate to create change.	1	2	3	4	5
	CUSTOMER FOCUS	U.S. Army (CF) and Interagency comments and recommendations often lead to changes.	1	2	3	4	5
		U.S. Army (CF) and Interagency input directly influences our decisions.	1	2	3	4	5
		All members have a deep understanding of U.S. Army and Interagency wants and needs.	1	2	3	4	5
		The interests of the U.S. Army and Interagency often get ignored in our decisions.	1	2	3	4	5
		We encourage direct contact with U.S. Army and Interagency by our people.	1	2	3	4	5
	ORGANIZATIONAL LEARNING	We view failure as an opportunity for learning and improvement.	1	2	3	4	5
		Innovation and risk taking are encouraged and rewarded.	1	2	3	4	5
		Lots of things "fall between the cracks".	1	2	3	4	5
		Learning is an important objective in our day-to-day work.	1	2	3	4	5
		We make certain that the "right hand knows what the left hand is doing."	1	2	3	4	5
MISSION	STRATEGIC DIRECTION AND INTENT	There is a long-term purpose and direction for your SF Group.	1	2	3	4	5
		Our strategy leads other Army or SOF organizations to change the way they conduct operations.	1	2	3	4	5
		There is a clear ARSOF mission that gives meaning and direction to our work at the SF Group.	1	2	3	4	5
		There is a clear strategy for the future of the SF Group.	1	2	3	4	5
		Our strategic direction at the SF Group is unclear to me.	1	2	3	4	5
	GOALS AND OBJECTIVES	There is widespread agreement about the SF Group's goals.	1	2	3	4	5
		Leaders set goals that are ambitious, but realistic.	1	2	3	4	5
		The leadership has "gone on record" about the objectives we are trying to meet.	1	2	3	4	5
		We continuously track our progress against our stated goals.	1	2	3	4	5
		Group members understand what needs to be done for us to succeed in the long run.	1	2	3	4	5
	VISION	We have a shared vision of what the SF Group will be like in the future.	1	2	3	4	5
		Leaders have a long-term viewpoint.	1	2	3	4	5
		Short-term thinking often compromises our long-term vision.	1	2	3	4	5
		The vision for the SF Group creates excitement and motivation for the SF Soldiers.	1	2	3	4	5
		We are able to meet short-term demands without compromising our long-term vision.	1	2	3	4	5

APPENDIX B. SUPPLEMENTAL QUESTIONS

BIOGRAPHICAL DATA:

1. Age:_____

2. Rank:_____

3. Years in the Army:_____

4. Years in Special Forces:_____

5. What was your former SF Group:_____

6. Years on an ODA:_____

7. Years in your former SF Group:_____

8. Assigned language:_____

9. Language capability score:_____

10. Number of combat deployments:_____

11. Number of deployments other than combat (ex. JCS, JCET, MLE):_____

12. Are you currently preparing for an upcoming COMBAT deployment in the next 6 months?: (Circle One): Yes   No

13. Are you currently preparing for a non-combat deployment in the next 6 months? (Circle One): Yes   No

14. Are you currently a member of the 4th BN? (Circle One): Yes No

15. Did you spend time in a position at your SF Group other than Detachment Commander? (Circle One): Yes   No

16. If you answered "yes" to question 14, how many months did you spend outside of an ODA? _____months.

17. Were you a member of the Commander's In-extremis Force (CIF) (Circle One) Yes   No

18. If you were a member of the CIF, was this a command in addition to a regular ODA? (Circle One): Yes   No

19. How many months ago did you leave your SF Group?_____months

20. How many months ago did you leave your former ODA?_____months

NOTE: For the following questions, please answer them based on your observations during your time at a Special Forces Group. This thesis research is interested in your opinions and knowledge specifically from that time period. What you have learned or perceived after your time at group is less important to the findings of this empirical research.

FUTURE MISSIONS AND DIRECTION OF ARMY SPECIAL FORCES:

1. Do you believe your SF unit (BN or GRP) is changing their mission focus? If so, to which of the following missions do you believe your unit is moving toward?
CIRCLE ONE ANSWER:

A: More FID focused
B: More UW focused
C: More DA focused
D: I do not believe my unit is changing mission focus.
E: Other (Fill in the blank)

2. On a scale of 1-5 how strongly do you believe the current or future operating environment requires the above change in mission focus?
CIRCLE ONE ANSWER:
 1=strongly disagree, 5=strongly agree.

1=Strongly Disagree	2	3	4	5=Strongly Agree

3. Regardless of your answers to the above questions, what would be your primary motivation to strongly support a change in mission focus within your SF Group?
CIRCLE ONE ANSWER:

A: In depth discussion with command elements on the reasons for a shift in mission focus and its utility for SF
B: Promotion based on acceptance and support of the decision to change mission focus
C: Strong direction from ODA or ODB leadership
D: Peer pressure from team members
E: Exciting opportunities for duty positions based on the changed mission
F: Other (Fill in the blank)

4. Which one of the following missions do you believe you, or SF Soldiers under your command, will most likely undertake the most in the next decade?
CIRCLE ONE ANSWER:

UW	FID	COIN	SR	HR	DA	CT

5. Given a choice from the following scenarios, which mission would you chose to conduct because it gives you the most fulfillment? **CIRCLE ONE ANSWER:**

A: FID mission in your AOR not tied directly to wartime
B: FID mission in your AOR where your partner force will undoubtedly conduct combat operations (after you leave)
C: FID mission in your AOR where you can combat advise (advise during the execution of the combat operations undertaken by your partner force)
D: Direct Combat operations (SR, DA, HR) unilaterally
E: Direct Combat Operations with a partner force, however SF is in the lead.
F: Low visibility, Advanced Special Operations

6. Given a choice from the following scenarios, which mission **DO YOU BELIEVE A MAJORITY OF MEMBERS OF YOUR FORMER ODA** would have chosen to conduct because it would have given them the most fulfillment? **CIRCLE ONE ANSWER:**

A: FID mission in your AOR not tied directly to wartime
B: FID mission in your AOR where your partner force will undoubtedly conduct combat operations (after you leave)
C: FID mission in your AOR where you can combat advise (advise during the execution of the combat operations undertaken by your partner force)
D: Direct Combat operations (SR, DA, HR) unilaterally
E: Direct Combat Operations with a partner force, however SF is in the lead.
F: Low visibility, Advanced Special Operations

7. Does the motto, "De Oppresso Liber" typify the missions you have conducted during your time in SF?
CIRCLE ONE ANSWER:

A: Yes, always	B: Mostly	C: No, not really though sometimes	D: Never

8. Does the motto, "De Oppresso Liber" accurately describe the missions you believe you will be conducting in the next decade in SF?
CIRCLE ONE ANSWER:

A: Yes, always	B: Mostly	C: No, not really though sometimes	D: Never

9. Do you see any utility for SF to have Soldiers like you maintain contact with indigenous persons (military or civilian) with whom you have contact on a deployment?

CIRCLE ONE ANSWER:

1=Yes I see extremely strong utility in maintaining contact	2=I see some utility in staying in contact	3=I have no opinion either way	4=I see minimal utility in maintaining contact	5=I see no utility in maintaining contact

10. In your professional opinion, should SF conduct more direct action operations or more indirect action operations?

*Direct Action Operations: "Short-duration strikes and other small-scale actions conducted as a special operation in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive environments and which employ specialized military capabilities to seize, destroy, capture, exploit, recover, or damage designated targets.," (Source: JP3-05)

*Indirect Action Operations: "This approach usually includes actions taken to enable GCTN partners to conduct operations against terrorists and their organizations as well as actions taken to shape and stabilize their operational environments as a means to erode the capabilities of terrorist organizations and degrade their ability to acquire support and sanctuary. The indirect approach includes use of the SOF core activities such as FID, SFA, IO, MISO, and CAO." (Source: JP3-05) Including UW.

CIRCLE ONE ANSWER:

A: Direct	B: Indirect

11. Do you believe a majority of the members of your former ODA would say SF should conduct more direct action operations or more indirect action operations?

CIRCLE ONE ANSWER:

A: Direct	B: Indirect

12. In your opinion, did the majority of members of your ODB perceive a change in mission from DA focused to UW/FID focus?

CIRCLE ONE ANSWER:

A: No, no one understood
B: Some understood a change was coming
C: I don't know
D: A majority of my ODB believed there was a change in mission
E: Yes everyone knew there was a change in mission

13. Regardless of your answer above, did you see a change in attitude and the way your ODB did business as a whole in order to prepare and adapt to a change in mission?
CIRCLE ONE ANSWER:

A: No, no one changed at all
B: There was minimal change
C: I don't know
D: A majority of my ODB changed how they were doing business
E: Yes my ODB changed and adapted their way of doing business and their attitudes

14. In your opinion, what percentage of your former ODA teammates were motivated to join Special Forces because they primarily wanted to conduct Direct Action operations and they believed SF would conduct DA a majority of the time?
CIRCLE ONE ANSWER:

A: 0%	B: 25%	C: 50%	D: 75%	E: 100%

15. What percentage of your former ODA teammates retired from the army or left Special Forces because they did not believe they were doing enough Direct Action operations?
CIRCLE ONE ANSWER:

A: 0%	B: 25%	C: 50%	D: 75%	E: 100%

AREAS OF TRAINING EMPHASIS:

1. How many **weeks per quarter** (12 weeks/quarter) did your ODA spend on weapons training or maintenance?
CIRCLE ONE ANSWER:

A: None	B: Less than 1	C: between 1-3	D: between 4-8	E: more than 8

2: Are you satisfied with the number of **weeks per quarter** your ODA conducted weapons training or maintenance?
CIRCLE ONE ANSWER:

A: Yes, I am satisfied
B: No, we spend too much time on this training
C: No, we need to spend more time on this training

3: What prevented you from spending more team training time on weapons training?
CIRCLE ONE ANSWER:

A: Language training
B: Individual schools
C: Team schools
D: Admin duties
E: We are at an acceptable level of weapons proficiency on the team
F: Other (fill in the blank):

4. How many **weeks per quarter** (12 weeks/quarter) did your ODA spend conducting Small Unit Tactics (SUT) training?
CIRCLE ONE ANSWER:

A: None	B: Less than 1	C: between 1-3	D: between 4-8	E: more than 8

5: Are you satisfied with the number of **weeks per quarter** your ODA conducted Small Unit Tactics (SUT) training?
CIRCLE ONE ANSWER:

A: Yes, I am satisfied
B: No, we spend too much time on this training
C: No, we need to spend more time on this training

6: What prevented your ODA from spending more team training time on Small Unit Tactics (SUT)?
CIRCLE ONE ANSWER:

A: Language training
B: Individual schools
C: Team schools
D: Admin duties
E: We are at an acceptable level of Small Unit Tactics on the team
F: Other (fill in the blank):

7. How many **weeks per quarter** (12 weeks/quarter) did your ODA spend on language training, as part of team training?
CIRCLE ONE ANSWER:

A: None	B: Less than 1	C: between 1-3	D: between 4-8	E: more than 8

8: Are you satisfied with the number of **weeks per quarter** your ODA conducted language training?
CIRCLE ONE ANSWER:

A: Yes, I am satisfied
B: No, we spend too much time on this training
C: No, we need to spend more time on this training

9: What prevented your ODA from spending more team training time on language training?
CIRCLE ONE ANSWER:

A: Range time
B: Individual schools
C: Team schools
D: Admin duties
E: We are at an acceptable level of language proficiency on the team
F: Other (fill in the blank):

10. How many **hours per week** did you spend personal time to develop your language skills?
CIRCLE ONE ANSWER:

A: Less than 2	B: 2-4	C: 4-8	D: 8-12	E: greater than 12

11: What prevented you from spending more personal time on developing your language proficiency?

Fill in the blank:

12: What would have motivated you to spend more of your personal time on developing your language proficiency during your time at the SF Group?

Fill in the blank:

13. How many **hours per week** did your ODA spend on enhancing cultural understanding of a culture from your assigned AOR?
CIRCLE ONE ANSWER:

A: Less than 2	B: 2-4	C: 4-8	D: 8-12	E: greater than 12

14: Are you satisfied with the number of **hours per week** your ODA conducted training to enhance your cultural understanding of cultures in your assigned AOR?
CIRCLE ONE ANSWER:

A: Yes, I am satisfied
B: No, we spend too much time on this training
C: No, we need to spend more time on this training

15: What prevented you from spending more team training time on enhancing your cultural understanding?
CIRCLE ONE ANSWER:

A: Range time
B: Individual schools
C: Team schools
D: Admin duties
E: We are at an acceptable level of cultural knowledge on the team
F: Other (fill in the blank):

16. How many hours per week did you devote personal time to enhancing your cultural understanding of cultures within your assigned AOR?
CIRCLE ONE ANSWER:

A: Less than 2	B: 2-4	C: 4-8	D: 8-12	E: greater than 12

17: What prevented you from spending more personal time on enhancing your cultural understanding of cultures within your assigned AOR?

Fill in the blank:

18. How many **weeks per quarter** (12 weeks/quarter) did your ODA conduct CQB?
CIRCLE ONE ANSWER:

A: None	B: Less than 1	C: between 1-3	D: between 4-8	E: more than 8

19: Are you satisfied with the number of weeks per quarter your ODA conducted CQB training?
CIRCLE ONE ANSWER:

A: Yes, I am satisfied
B: No, we spend too much time on this training
C: No, we need to spend more time on this training

20: What prevented you from spending more team training time on CQB?
CIRCLE ONE ANSWER:

A: Language/Cultural training
B: Individual schools
C: Team schools
D: Admin duties
E: We are at an acceptable level of CQB on the team
F: Other (fill in the blank):

21. Though several training tasks are important, what is the one area you believe your ODA needed to focus training on **THE MOST** to be successful in future missions?
CIRCLE ONE ANSWER:

A: Cultural awareness	B: Small Unit Tactics	C: ASOT
D: Instructor training	E: Diplomacy	F: CQB
G: Language proficiency	H: Marksmanship	I: Interpersonal communication techniques
J: Other (Fill in the blank):		

22. Based on the answer you provided for the above question, why did you select that answer?
CIRCLE ONE ANSWER:

A: My team was deficient in this task compared to the rest
B: This task was what I believed would be most useful in **upcoming deployments**
C: I believed this task will be **used most in the upcoming decade** of SF utilization
D: Other (fill in the blank)

23: Which of the following training tasks carried the most importance with your BN/Group command?
CIRCLE ONE ANSWER:

A:Cultural awareness	B:CQB	C:marksmanship
D:Small Unit Tactics	E:ASOT	F:instructor training
G:Language proficiency	H:diplomacy	I: interpersonal communication techniques
J: Other (fill in the blank):		

24. How closely did you follow your Group and BN (and possibly CO) CDR's training guidance?

CIRCLE ONE ANSWER:

A: Never	B: less than 50% of the time	C: 50% of the time	D: more than 50% of the time	E: Always	F: I did not know what my CDR's guidance was

25: How strictly was your CDR's guidance on training enforced?

CIRCLE ONE ANSWER:

A: Never	B: Sometimes	C: I don't know	D: Most of the time	E: Always

For the following questions, assume you, as an ODA Commander, had been given only the location of your deployment, the type of operations you will conduct (FID, Combat, UW, or CNT), and that you HAVE ONLY ONE WEEK to train (all other load out/admin tasks are complete) for the deployment. Additionally, please answer the following questions based on your perception of what the majority of your ODA teammates' opinions would be to the scenarios presented:

26: Given one week of training prior to a FID deployment, what training would a majority of your ODA members have liked to have seen conducted most?

CIRCLE ONE ANSWER:

A: Marksmanship	B: Cultural Awareness training	C: Advanced Urban Combat (CQB),
D: Advanced driving	E: Combatives	F: Small Unit Tactics
G: Other (fill in the blank):		

27: Given one week of training prior to a Combat deployment (Afghanistan), what training would a majority of your ODA members have liked to have seen conducted most?

CIRCLE ONE ANSWER:

A: Marksmanship	B: Cultural Awareness training	C: Advanced Urban Combat (CQB),
D: Advanced driving	E: Combatives	F: Small Unit Tactics
G: Other (fill in the blank):		

28: Given one week of training prior to a UW deployment, what training would a majority of your ODA members have liked to have seen conducted most?

CIRCLE ONE ANSWER:

A: Marksmanship	B: Cultural Awareness training	C: Advanced Urban Combat (CQB),
D: Advanced driving	E: Combatives	F: Small Unit Tactics
G: Other (fill in the blank):		

29: Given one week of training prior to a Counter-Narcoterrorism (CNT) deployment, what training would a majority of your ODA members have liked to have seen conducted most?
CIRCLE ONE ANSWER:

A: Marksmanship	B: Cultural Awareness training	C: Advanced Urban Combat (CQB),
D: Advanced driving	E: Combatives	F: Small Unit Tactics
G: Other (fill in the blank):		

30. Realistically, how much time would you have devoted to staying in contact with indigenous persons (military or civilian) with whom you had contact on a deployment by phone, email, or letters?
CIRCLE ONE ANSWER:

A: 1 hour/week	B: 1 hour/month	C: 1 hour per quarter	D: 1 hour per year

31: What would have motivated you to spend more time staying in contact with indigenous persons with whom you had contact during a deployment?
CIRCLE ONE ANSWER:

A: A monitored system that would be tied to performance evaluations
B: Potential for future travel to visit your indigenous contacts
C: Recognition and reward from COC
D: Recognition and praise from fellow team members
E: Specialty pays based on performance at maintaining contact

REWARDS AND DESIRES:

1. Given Peacetime operations, how many **months per year** would you have liked to deploy to a foreign country to conduct training with partner forces?
ANSWERS: CIRCLE ONE ANSWER; 1-12 months

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12

2. On a scale from 1-5 how much would the above opportunity have motivated you to increase your language proficiency and cultural knowledge?
CIRCLE ONE ANSWER:

1=not motivate me at all	2=provide minimal motivation	3=no opinion	, 4=provide some motivation	5=provide great motivation

3. How likely were you to be rewarded by the chain of command for excelling at your language (not to include US Army pay incentives for language proficiency).
CIRCLE ONE ANSWER:

No chance of reward	Not likely	Moderately likely	Likely	Highly likely to be rewarded

4. What type of reward from your Chain of Command would have motivated you the most to increase your language proficiency?
CIRCLE ONE ANSWER:

A: Military award (ex ARCOM)
B: Selection for best deployments based on language proficiency
C: Promotion tied to language proficiency
D: Selection for future duty assignments based on language proficiency
E: Other (fill in the blank)

5. How likely were you to be rewarded by teammates for excelling at your language?
CIRCLE ONE ANSWER:

No chance of reward	Not likely	Moderately likely	Likely	Highly likely to be rewarded

6. How much did you enjoy working with the indigenous forces in your assigned AOR?
CIRCLE ONE ANSWER:

1=No enjoyment	2=Minimal enjoyment	3=No opinion	4=A good amount of enjoyment	5=Great enjoyment

7. How much did you enjoy being immersed in the culture(s) of your assigned AOR?
CIRCLE ONE ANSWER:

1=No enjoyment	2=Minimal enjoyment	3=No opinion	4=A good amount of enjoyment	5=Great enjoyment

8. Did you enjoy learning about cultural differences between the American culture and those of your assigned AOR?
CIRCLE ONE ANSWER:

1=No enjoyment	2=Minimal enjoyment	3=No opinion	4=A good amount of enjoyment	5=Great enjoyment

9. Would you have enjoyed staying in touch with indigenous persons (military or civilian) with whom you have contact on a deployment?
CIRCLE ONE ANSWER:

1=No enjoyment	2=Minimal enjoyment	3=No opinion	4=A good amount of enjoyment	5=Great enjoyment

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